@article{nokey,

title = {Beyond financial regulation of crypto-asset wallet software: In search of secondary liability},

author = {Barbereau, T. and Bod\'{o}, B.},

url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364923000390},

doi = {10.1016/j.clsr.2023.105829},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-06-22},

urldate = {2023-06-22},

journal = {Computer Law \& Security Review},

volume = {49},

number = {105829},

abstract = {Since Bitcoin, the blockchain space considerably evolved. One crucial piece of software to interact with blockchains and hold private-public key pairs to distinct crypto-assets and securities are wallets. Wallet software can be offered by liable third-parties (‘custodians’) who hold certain rights over assets and transactions. As parties subject to financial regulation, they are to uphold Anti-money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorist (AML/CFT) standards by undertaking Know-Your-Customer (KYC) checks on users of their services.

In juxtaposition, wallet software can also be issued without the involvement of a liable third-party. As no KYC is performed and users have full ‘freedom to act’, such ‘non-custodial’ wallet software is popular in criminal undertakings. They are required to interact with peer-to-peer applications and organisations running on blockchains whose benefits are not the subject of this paper. To date, financial regulation fails to adequately address such wallet software because it presumes the existence of a registered, liable entity offering said software. As illustrated in the case of Tornado Cash, financial regulation fails to trace chains of secondary liability. Alas, the considered solution is a systematic surveillance of all transactions.

Against this backdrop, this paper sets forth an alternative approach rooted in copyright law. Concepts that pertain to secondary liability prove of value to develop a flexible, principles-based approach to the regulation of non-custodial wallet software that accounts for both, infringing and non-infringing uses.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Export control of cybersurveillance items in the new dual-use regulation: The challenges of applying human rights logic to export control},

author = {van Daalen, O. and van Hoboken, J. and Rucz, M.},

doi = {10.1016/j.clsr.2022.105789},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-04-21},

journal = {Computer Law \& Security Review},

volume = {48},

abstract = {In 2021, the Recast Dual-Use Regulation entered into force. The regulation includes a heavily debated new provision on the export control of so-called cybersurveillance items. This provision departs from the traditional logic of export control rules in multiple ways. Most importantly, it positions human rights considerations as an important factor in the export control of a flexible range of technologies. This article explores the operation, implications and challenges of this new human rights-orientated approach to export control of digital surveillance technologies. Taking the definition of cybersurveillance items as a starting point of the analysis, the article draws on surveillance-related case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union, to define the potential scope of application of the open-ended cybersurveillance concept of the Regulation. By exploring how this concept maps to technologies often connected with human rights infringements, such as facial recognition, location tracking and open-source intelligence, the article highlights the challenges of applying this new approach and underscores the need for its further development in practice.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{nokey,

title = {Microtargeted propaganda by foreign actors: An interdisciplinary exploration},

author = {Fahy, R. and Dobber, T. and Zuiderveen Borgesius, F. and Shires, J.},

url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/MaastrichtJournalofEuropeanandComparativeLaw_2021_6.pdf},

doi = {10.1177/1023263X211042471},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-01-25},

urldate = {2021-12-31},

journal = {Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law},

pages = {856-877},

abstract = {This article discusses a problem that has received scant attention in literature: microtargeted propaganda by foreign actors. Microtargeting involves collecting information about people, and using that information to show them targeted political advertisements. Such microtargeting enables advertisers to target ads to specific groups of people, for instance people who visit certain websites, forums, or Facebook groups. This article focuses on one type of microtargeting: microtargeting by foreign actors. For example, Russia has targeted certain groups in the US with ads, aiming to sow discord. Foreign actors could also try to influence European elections, for instance by advertising in favour of a certain political party. Foreign propaganda possibilities existed before microtargeting. This article explores two questions. In what ways, if any, is microtargeted propaganda by foreign actors different from other foreign propaganda? What could lawmakers in Europe do to mitigate the risks of microtargeted propaganda?},

note = {MJ, vol. 28, nr. 6, 2021},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Helberger2021bb,

title = {Towards Unfair Political Practices Law: Learning lessons from the regulation of unfair commercial practices for online political advertising},

author = {Helberger, N. and Dobber, T. and Vreese, C.H. de},

url = {https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-12-3-2021/5338},

year  = {2021},

date = {2021-08-26},

journal = {JIPITEC},

volume = {12},

number = {3},

pages = {273-296},

abstract = {Online political advertising operates in a tense forcefield between political and commercial elements and thus presents regulators with a difficult conundrum: because online political advertising is political rather than commercial speech, it is destined to follow a different regulatory tradition than commercial advertising. And yet many of the tools used, players involved and concerns triggered by modern online political advertising strategies very much resemble the tools, players and concerns in online commercial targeting. Commercial advertising is subject to consumer law and unfair advertising regulation, including rules about unfair commercial practices. Unfair commercial practices law and other rules about commercial advertising, however, are explicitly not applicable to forms of non-commercial political or ideological advertising. An important reason why this is so is the different level of protection of political and commercial speech under fundamental rights law standards. And yet with the ongoing commercial turn in advertising, the traditional division between forms of commercial and political advertising is no longer that self-evident. Also, it cannot be denied that commercial advertising law has a long tradition of thinking of where and how to draw the line between lawful advertising and unlawful persuasion through withholding or misleading consumers about the information they need to take informed decisions, or abusing superior knowledge, exerting undue psychological pressure and engaging in other forms of unfair behaviour. The question this article explores is whether there are lessons to be learned from the regulation of commercial advertising for the pending initiatives at the national and the European level to regulate online political advertising, and online political targeting in specific.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{vanHoboken2021b,

title = {Smartphone platforms as privacy regulators},

author = {van Hoboken, J. and Fahy, R.},

url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Smartphone-platforms-as-privacy-regulators.pdf},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2021.105557},

year  = {2021},

date = {2021-06-10},

journal = {Computer Law \& Security Review},

volume = {41},

abstract = {A series of recent developments highlight the increasingly important role of online platforms in impacting data privacy in today's digital economy. Revelations and parliamentary hearings about privacy violations in Facebook's app and service partner ecosystem, EU Court of Justice judgments on joint responsibility of platforms and platform users, and the rise of smartphone app ecosystems where app behaviour is governed by app distribution platforms and operating systems, all show that platform policies can make or break the enjoyment of privacy by users. In this article, we examine these developments and explore the question of what can and should be the role of platforms in protecting data privacy of their users.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{vanHoboken2021,

title = {Regulating Disinformation in Europe: Implications for Speech and Privacy},

author = {van Hoboken, J. and Fahy, R.},

url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Regulating-Disinformation-in-Europe.pdf},

year  = {2021},

date = {2021-06-01},

journal = {UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law},

volume = {6},

number = {1},

pages = {9-36},

abstract = {This Article examines the ongoing dynamics in the regulation of disinformation in Europe, focusing on the intersection between the right to

freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Importantly, there has been a recent wave of regulatory measures and other forms of pressure on online platforms to tackle disinformation in Europe. These measures play out in different ways at the intersection of the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Crucially, as governments, journalists, and researchers seek greater transparency and access to information from online platforms to evaluate their impact on the health of their democracies, these measures raise acute issues related to user privacy. Indeed, platforms that once refused to cooperate with governments in identifying users allegedly responsible for disseminating illegal or harmful content are now expanding cooperation. However, while platforms are increasingly facilitating government access to user data, platforms are also invoking data protection law concerns as a shield in response to recent efforts at increased platform transparency. At

the same time, data protection law provides for one of the main systemic regulatory safeguards in Europe. It protects user autonomy concerning datadriven campaigns, requiring transparency for internet audiences about targeting and data subject rights in relation to audience platforms, such as social media companies.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Helberger2021b,

title = {Regulation of news recommenders in the Digital Services Act: empowering David against the Very Large Online Goliath},

author = {Helberger, N. and Drunen, M. van and Vrijenhoek, S. and M\"{o}ller, J.},

url = {https://policyreview.info/articles/news/regulation-news-recommenders-digital-services-act-empowering-david-against-very-large},

year  = {2021},

date = {2021-02-26},

journal = {Internet Policy Review},

note = {Opinion},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Bod\'{o}2020b,

title = {Mediated trust: A theoretical framework to address the trustworthiness of technological trust mediators},

author = {Bod\'{o}, B.},

url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1461444820939922},

doi = {10.1177/1461444820939922},

year  = {2020},

date = {2020-07-17},

journal = {New Media \& Society},

abstract = {This article considers the impact of digital technologies on the interpersonal and institutional logics of trust production. It introduces the new theoretical concept of technology-mediated trust to analyze the role of complex techno-social assemblages in trust production and distrust management. The first part of the article argues that globalization and digitalization have unleashed a crisis of trust, as traditional institutional and interpersonal logics are not attuned to deal with the risks introduced by the prevalence of digital technologies. In the second part, the article describes how digital intermediation has transformed the traditional logics of interpersonal and institutional trust formation and created new trust-mediating services. Finally, the article asks as follows: why should we trust these technological trust mediators? The conclusion is that at best, it is impossible to establish the trustworthiness of trust mediators, and that at worst, we have no reason to trust them.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Helberger2020d,

title = {The Political Power of Platforms: How Current Attempts to Regulate Misinformation Amplify Opinion Power},

author = {Helberger, N.},

url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2020.1773888},

year  = {2020},

date = {2020-07-14},

journal = {Digital Journalism},

volume = {8},

number = {6},

pages = {842-854},

abstract = {This contribution critically reviews the ongoing policy initiatives in Europe to impose greater societal responsibility on social media platforms. I discuss the current regulatory approach of treating social platforms as mere 'intermediaries' of the speech of others and propose a different perspective. Instead of perceiving platforms as intermediaries and facilitators of the speech of others, I view social media platforms as active political actors in their own right, and wielders of considerable opinion power. I will explain how taking the perspective of opinion power throws a very different, and rather alarming light on the recent regulatory initiatives.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Yakovleva2020,

title = {Privacy Protection(ism): The Latest Wave of Trade Constraints on Regulatory Autonomy},

author = {Yakovleva, S.},

url = {https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol74/iss2/5/},

year  = {2020},

date = {2020-02-27},

journal = {University of Miami Law Review},

volume = {74},

number = {2},

pages = {416-519},

abstract = {Countries spend billions of dollars each year to strengthen their discursive power to shape international policy debates. They do so because in public policy conversations labels and narratives matter enormously. The “digital protectionism” label has been used in the last decade as a tool to gain the policy upper hand in digital trade policy debates about cross-border flows of personal and other data. Using the Foucauldian framework of discourse analysis, this Article brings a unique perspective on this topic. The Article makes two central arguments. First, the Article argues that the term “protectionism” is not endowed with an inherent meaning but is socially constructed by the power of discourse used in international negotiations, and in the interpretation and application of international trade policy and rules. In other words, there are as many definitions of “(digital) protectionism” as there are discourses. The U.S. and E.U. “digital trade” discourses illustrate this point. Using the same term, those trading partners advance utterly different discourses and agendas: an economic discourse with economic efficiency as the main benchmark (United States), and a more multidisciplinary discourse where both economic efficiency and protection of fundamental rights are equally important (European Union). Second, based on a detailed evaluation of the economic “digital trade” discourse, the Article contends that the coining of the term “digital protectionism” to refer to domestic information governance policies not yet fully covered by trade law disciplines is not a logical step to respond to objectively changing circumstances, but rather a product of that discourse, which is coming to dominate U.S.-led international trade negotiations. The Article demonstrates how this redefinition of “protectionism” has already resulted in the adoption of international trade rules in recent trade agreements further restricting domestic autonomy to protect the rights to privacy and the protection of personal data. The Article suggests that the distinction between privacy and personal data protection and protectionism is a moral question, not a question of economic efficiency. Therefore, when a policy conversation, such as the one on cross-border data flows, involves noneconomic spill-over effects to individual rights, such conversation should not be confined within the straightjacket of trade economics, but rather placed in a broader normative perspective. Finally, the Article argues that, in conducting recently restarted multilateral negotiations on electronic commerce at the World Trade Organization, countries should rethink the goals of international trade for the twenty-first century. Such goals should determine and define the discourse, not the other way around. The discussion should not be about what “protectionism” means but about how far domestic regimes are willing to let trade rules interfere in their autonomy to protect their societal, cultural, and political values.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Dobber2020,

title = {The regulation of online political micro-targeting in Europe},

author = {Dobber, T. and Fahy, R. and Zuiderveen Borgesius, F.},

url = {https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/regulation-online-political-micro-targeting-europe},

doi = {10.14763/2019.4.1440},

year  = {2020},

date = {2020-01-16},

journal = {Internet Policy Review},

volume = {8},

number = {4},

abstract = {In this paper, we examine how online political micro-targeting is regulated in Europe. While there are no specific rules on such micro-targeting, there are general rules that apply. We focus on three fields of law: data protection law, freedom of expression, and sector-specific rules for political advertising; for the latter we examine four countries. We argue that the rules in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) are necessary, but not sufficient. We show that political advertising, including online political micro-targeting, is protected by the right to freedom of expression. That right is not absolute, however. From a European human rights perspective, it is possible for lawmakers to limit the possibilities for political advertising. Indeed, some countries ban TV advertising for political parties during elections.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Fahy2019eb,

title = {European Regulation of Smartphone Ecosystems},

author = {Fahy, R. and van Hoboken, J.},

url = {https://edpl.lexxion.eu/article/EDPL/2019/4/6},

doi = {https://doi.org/10.21552/edpl/2019/4/6},

year  = {2019},

date = {2019-12-13},

journal = {European Data Protection Law Review (EDPL)},

volume = {5},

number = {4},

pages = {476-491},

abstract = {For the first time, two pieces of EU legislation will specifically target smartphone ecosystems in relation to smartphone and mobile software (eg, iOS and Android) privacy, and use and monetisation of data. And yet, both pieces of legislation approach data use and data monetisation from radically contrasting perspectives. The first is the proposed ePrivacy Regulation, which seeks to provide enhanced protection against user data monitoring and tracking in smartphones, and safeguard privacy in electronic communications. On the other hand, the recently enacted Platform-to-Business Regulation 2019, seeks to bring fairness to platform-business user relations (including app stores and app developers), and is crucially built upon the premise that the ability to access and use data, including personal data, can enable important value creation in the online platform economy. This article discusses how these two Regulations will apply to smartphone ecosystems, especially relating to user and device privacy. The article analyses the potential tension points between the two sets of rules, which result from the underlying policy objectives of safeguarding privacy in electronic communications and the functioning of the digital economy in the emerging era of platform governance. The article concludes with a discussion on how to address these issues, at the intersection of privacy and competition in the digital platform economy.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Helberger2019,

title = {Germany proposes Europe's first diversity rules for social media platforms},

author = {Helberger, N. and Leerssen, P. and Drunen, M. van},

url = {https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2019/05/29/germany-proposes-europes-first-diversity-rules-for-social-media-platforms/},

year  = {2019},

date = {2019-06-06},

journal = {LSE Media Policy Project Blog},

volume = {2019},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{vanDaalen2018b,

title = {Het privacy-argument tegen de Dopamine Machine},

author = {van Daalen, O.},

url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/PrivacyInformatie_2018_2.pdf},

year  = {2018},

date = {2018-10-12},

journal = {Privacy \& Informatierecht},

volume = {2018},

number = {2},

pages = {39-41},

abstract = {De kinderen van Apple-baas Steve Jobs mochten geen iPad gebruiken. 1 Maar Jobs was niet de enige. Veel techies in Silicon Valley zijn zich bewust van de verslavende effecten van IT \textendash ze hebben de producten namelijk zelf ontwikkeld. En nu steeds meer spijtoptanten oproepen tot regulering van onlinediensten zoals Facebook, vraag ik me af: welke rol kan het privacyrecht daarbij spelen?},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Bod\'{o}2018,

title = {Political micro-targeting: a Manchurian candidate or just a dark horse?},

author = {Bod\'{o}, B. and Helberger, N. and Vreese, C.H. de},

url = {https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/political-micro-targeting-manchurian-candidate-or-just-dark-horse},

year  = {2018},

date = {2018-01-19},

journal = {Internet Policy Review},

volume = {2017},

number = {4},

abstract = {Political micro-targeting (PMT) has become a popular topic both in academia and in the public discussions after the surprise results of the 2016 US presidential election, the UK vote on leaving the European Union, and a number of general elections in Europe in 2017. Yet, we still know little about whether PMT is a tool with such destructive potential that it requires close societal control, or if it’s “just” a new phenomenon with currently unknown capacities, but which can ultimately be incorporated into our political processes.   In this article we identify the points where we think we need to further develop our analytical capacities around PMT. We argue that we need to decouple research from the US context, and through more non-US and comparative research we need to develop a better understanding of the macro, meso, and micro level factors that affect the adoption and success of PMTs across different countries. One of the most under-researched macro-level factors is law. We argue that PMT research must develop a better understanding of law, especially in Europe, where the regulatory frameworks around platforms, personal data, political and commercial speech do shape the use and effectiveness of PMT. We point out that the incorporation of such new factors calls for the sophistication of research designs, which currently rely too much on qualitative methods, and use too little of the data that exists on PMT. And finally, we call for distancing PMT research from the hype surrounding the new PMT capabilities, and the moral panics that quickly develop around its uses.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{Bosch2016,

title = {Wifi-tracking in de winkel(straat): inbreuk op de privacy?},

author = {Bosch, B.F.E. and van Eijk, N.},

url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/PrivacyInformatie_2016_6.pdf},

year  = {2016},

date = {2016-12-20},

journal = {Privacy \& Informatie},

number = {6},

pages = {238-246},

abstract = {Tegenwoordig wordt de consument op steeds grotere schaal gevolgd via de wifi-signalen die smartphones uitzenden. Inzicht in hoe consumenten zich gedragen in een winkel levert commerci\"{e}le voordelen op voor de winkeliers, maar ook risico's voor de persoonlijke levenssfeer. Onder de Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens is gegevensverwerking via wifi-tracking toegestaan, mits wordt voldaan aan de strenge eisen die de wet stelt. Ter vergelijking wordt gekeken naar de regulering van wifi-tracking in de Verenigde Staten.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{,

title = {Regulating the new information intermediaries as gatekeepers of information diversity},

author = {K. Kleinen-von K\"{o}nigsl\"{o}w and Rob  van der Noll and N.  Helberger},

url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1618.pdf},

year  = {2015},

date = {2015-09-01},

journal = {Info},

number = {6},

pages = {50-71.},

note = {

	DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/info-05-2015-0034

},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{,

title = {Van maatstaf naar maatwerk: een korte geschiedenis van economische regulering},

author = {J.P.  Poort},

url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/03%20-%20TvT_Poort%20en%20Tieben.pdf},

year  = {2011},

date = {2011-07-26},

journal = {Tijdschrift voor Toezicht},

number = {4},

pages = {27-44},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{,

title = {Ireland: Milestones in Online Self-Regulation},

author = {T.  McGonagle},

url = {http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/milestones.html},

year  = {2003},

date = {2003-09-30},

journal = {Computer und Recht International},

number = {3},

pages = {93-94},

abstract = {

	Dit artikel beschrijft twee belangrijke ontwikkelingen op het gebied van zelfregulering van Internet in Ierland. Ten eerste de toepassing van de (allereerste) gedragscode (Code of Practice and Ethics) door de vereniging van Internet Service Providers in Ierland. Ten tweede beschrijft dit artikel het eerste belangrijke rapport van het Ierse online meldpunt voor kinderpornografie.

},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}