Grondrechten
Senftleben, M.; Quintais, J.; Meiring, A.
How the EU Outsources the Task of Human Rights Protection to Platforms and Users: The Case of UGC Monetization Tijdschriftartikel
In: Berkeley Technology Law Journal, vol. 38, ed. 3, pp. 933-1010, 2024.
@article{nokey,
title = {How the EU Outsources the Task of Human Rights Protection to Platforms and Users: The Case of UGC Monetization},
author = {Senftleben, M. and Quintais, J. and Meiring, A.},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4421150
https://btlj.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/0004_38-3_Senftleben.pdf},
year = {2024},
date = {2024-01-23},
urldate = {2023-10-12},
journal = {Berkeley Technology Law Journal},
volume = {38},
issue = {3},
pages = {933-1010},
abstract = {With the shift from the traditional safe harbor for hosting to statutory content filtering and licensing obligations, EU copyright law has substantially curtailed the freedom of users to upload and share their content creations. Seeking to avoid overbroad inroads into freedom of expression, EU law obliges online platforms and the creative industry to take into account human rights when coordinating their content filtering actions. Platforms must also establish complaint and redress procedures for users. The European Commission will initiate stakeholder dialogues to identify best practices. These “safety valves” in the legislative package, however, are mere fig leaves. Instead of safeguarding human rights, the EU legislator outsources human rights obligations to the platform industry. At the same time, the burden of policing content moderation systems is imposed on users who are unlikely to bring complaints in each individual case. The new legislative design in the EU will thus “conceal” human rights violations instead of bringing them to light. Nonetheless, the DSA rests on the same \textendash highly problematic \textendash approach.
Against this background, the paper discusses the weakening \textendash and potential loss \textendash of fundamental freedoms as a result of the departure from the traditional notice-and-takedown approach. Adding a new element to the ongoing debate on content licensing and filtering, the analysis will devote particular attention to the fact that EU law, for the most part, has left untouched the private power of platforms to determine the “house rules” governing the most popular copyright-owner reaction to detected matches between protected works and content uploads: the (algorithmic) monetization of that content. Addressing the “legal vacuum” in the field of content monetization, the analysis explores outsourcing and concealment risks in this unregulated space. Focusing on large-scale platforms for user-generated content, such as YouTube, Instagram and TikTok, two normative problems come to the fore: (1) the fact that rightholders, when opting for monetization, de facto monetize not only their own rights but also the creative input of users; (2) the fact that user creativity remains unremunerated as long as the monetization option is only available to rightholders. As a result of this configuration, the monetization mechanism disregards users’ right to (intellectual) property and discriminates against user creativity. Against this background, we discuss whether the DSA provisions that seek to ensure transparency of content moderation actions and terms and conditions offer useful sources of information that could empower users. Moreover, we raise the question whether the detailed regulation of platform actions in the DSA may resolve the described human rights dilemmas to some extent.},
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With the shift from the traditional safe harbor for hosting to statutory content filtering and licensing obligations, EU copyright law has substantially curtailed the freedom of users to upload and share their content creations. Seeking to avoid overbroad inroads into freedom of expression, EU law obliges online platforms and the creative industry to take into account human rights when coordinating their content filtering actions. Platforms must also establish complaint and redress procedures for users. The European Commission will initiate stakeholder dialogues to identify best practices. These “safety valves” in the legislative package, however, are mere fig leaves. Instead of safeguarding human rights, the EU legislator outsources human rights obligations to the platform industry. At the same time, the burden of policing content moderation systems is imposed on users who are unlikely to bring complaints in each individual case. The new legislative design in the EU will thus “conceal” human rights violations instead of bringing them to light. Nonetheless, the DSA rests on the same – highly problematic – approach.
Against this background, the paper discusses the weakening – and potential loss – of fundamental freedoms as a result of the departure from the traditional notice-and-takedown approach. Adding a new element to the ongoing debate on content licensing and filtering, the analysis will devote particular attention to the fact that EU law, for the most part, has left untouched the private power of platforms to determine the “house rules” governing the most popular copyright-owner reaction to detected matches between protected works and content uploads: the (algorithmic) monetization of that content. Addressing the “legal vacuum” in the field of content monetization, the analysis explores outsourcing and concealment risks in this unregulated space. Focusing on large-scale platforms for user-generated content, such as YouTube, Instagram and TikTok, two normative problems come to the fore: (1) the fact that rightholders, when opting for monetization, de facto monetize not only their own rights but also the creative input of users; (2) the fact that user creativity remains unremunerated as long as the monetization option is only available to rightholders. As a result of this configuration, the monetization mechanism disregards users’ right to (intellectual) property and discriminates against user creativity. Against this background, we discuss whether the DSA provisions that seek to ensure transparency of content moderation actions and terms and conditions offer useful sources of information that could empower users. Moreover, we raise the question whether the detailed regulation of platform actions in the DSA may resolve the described human rights dilemmas to some extent.
Dommering, E.
Opinie: Koranverbrandingen in Zweden, Denemarken en Nederland Tijdschriftartikel
In: Nederlands Juristenblad (NJB), ed. 29, nr. 2125, pp. 2480-2482, 2023.
@article{nokey,
title = {Opinie: Koranverbrandingen in Zweden, Denemarken en Nederland},
author = {Dommering, E.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/njb_2023_29/},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-10-05},
journal = {Nederlands Juristenblad (NJB)},
number = {2125},
issue = {29},
pages = {2480-2482},
abstract = {De stelling van onder andere de Minister van Justitie dat het verbranden van boeken nu eenmaal mag in onze rechtsstaat berust op een dubbele dwaling: \'{e}\'{e}n omtrent het object van de vrijheid van meningsuiting en \'{e}\'{e}n omtrent hoe in deze tijd van sociale media om te gaan met het conflict tussen de vrijheid van meningsuiting en de vrijheid van godsdienst. },
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De stelling van onder andere de Minister van Justitie dat het verbranden van boeken nu eenmaal mag in onze rechtsstaat berust op een dubbele dwaling: één omtrent het object van de vrijheid van meningsuiting en één omtrent hoe in deze tijd van sociale media om te gaan met het conflict tussen de vrijheid van meningsuiting en de vrijheid van godsdienst.
Quintais, J.; Appelman, N.; Fahy, R.
Using Terms and Conditions to apply Fundamental Rights to Content Moderation Tijdschriftartikel
In: German Law Journal, 2023.
@article{nokey,
title = {Using Terms and Conditions to apply Fundamental Rights to Content Moderation},
author = {Quintais, J. and Appelman, N. and Fahy, R.},
doi = {10.1017/glj.2023.53},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-07-11},
journal = {German Law Journal},
abstract = {Large online platforms provide an unprecedented means for exercising freedom of expression online and wield enormous power over public participation in the online democratic space. However, it is increasingly clear that their systems, where (automated) content moderation decisions are taken based on a platformʼs terms and conditions (T\&Cs), are fundamentally broken. Content moderation systems have been said to undermine freedom of expression, especially where important public interest speech ends up suppressed, such as speech by minority and marginalized groups. Indeed, these content moderation systems have been criticized for their overly vague rules of operation, inconsistent enforcement, and an overdependence on automation. Therefore, in order to better protect freedom of expression online, international human rights bodies and civil society organizations have argued that platforms “should incorporate directly” principles of fundamental rights law into their T\&Cs. Under EU law, and apart from a rule in the Terrorist Content Regulation, platforms had until recently no explicit obligation to incorporate fundamental rights into their T\&Cs. However, an important provision in the Digital Services Act (DSA) will change this. Crucially, Article 14 DSA lays down new rules on how platforms can enforce their T\&Cs, including that platforms must have “due regard” to the “fundamental rights” of users under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this article, we critically examine the topic of enforceability of fundamental rights via T\&Cs through the prism of Article 14 DSA. We ask whether this provision requires platforms to apply EU fundamental rights law and to what extent this may curb the power of Big Tech over online speech. We conclude that Article 14 will make it possible, in principle, to establish the indirect horizontal effect of fundamental rights in the relationship between online platforms and their users. But in order for the application and enforcement of T\&Cs to take due regard of fundamental rights, Article 14 must be operationalized within the framework of the international and European fundamental rights standards. If this is possible Article 14 may fulfil its revolutionary potential.
},
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Large online platforms provide an unprecedented means for exercising freedom of expression online and wield enormous power over public participation in the online democratic space. However, it is increasingly clear that their systems, where (automated) content moderation decisions are taken based on a platformʼs terms and conditions (T&Cs), are fundamentally broken. Content moderation systems have been said to undermine freedom of expression, especially where important public interest speech ends up suppressed, such as speech by minority and marginalized groups. Indeed, these content moderation systems have been criticized for their overly vague rules of operation, inconsistent enforcement, and an overdependence on automation. Therefore, in order to better protect freedom of expression online, international human rights bodies and civil society organizations have argued that platforms “should incorporate directly” principles of fundamental rights law into their T&Cs. Under EU law, and apart from a rule in the Terrorist Content Regulation, platforms had until recently no explicit obligation to incorporate fundamental rights into their T&Cs. However, an important provision in the Digital Services Act (DSA) will change this. Crucially, Article 14 DSA lays down new rules on how platforms can enforce their T&Cs, including that platforms must have “due regard” to the “fundamental rights” of users under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this article, we critically examine the topic of enforceability of fundamental rights via T&Cs through the prism of Article 14 DSA. We ask whether this provision requires platforms to apply EU fundamental rights law and to what extent this may curb the power of Big Tech over online speech. We conclude that Article 14 will make it possible, in principle, to establish the indirect horizontal effect of fundamental rights in the relationship between online platforms and their users. But in order for the application and enforcement of T&Cs to take due regard of fundamental rights, Article 14 must be operationalized within the framework of the international and European fundamental rights standards. If this is possible Article 14 may fulfil its revolutionary potential.
van Daalen, O.
The right to encryption: Privacy as preventing unlawful access Tijdschriftartikel
In: Computer Law & Security Review, vol. 49, 2023.
@article{nokey,
title = {The right to encryption: Privacy as preventing unlawful access},
author = {van Daalen, O.},
url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364923000146},
doi = {10.1016/j.clsr.2023.105804},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-05-23},
journal = {Computer Law \& Security Review},
volume = {49},
abstract = {Encryption technologies are a fundamental building block of modern digital infrastructure, but plans to curb these technologies continue to spring up. Even in the European Union, where their application is by now firmly embedded in legislation, lawmakers are again calling for measures which would impact these technologies. One of the most important arguments in this debate are human rights, most notably the rights to privacy and to freedom of expression. And although some authors have in the past explored how encryption technologies support human rights, this connection is not yet firmly grounded in an analysis of European human rights case law. This contribution aims to fill this gap, developing a framework for assessing restrictions of encryption technologies under the rights to privacy and freedom of expression as protected under the European Convention of Human Rights (the Convention) and the Charter of Fundamental rights in the European Union (the Charter). In the first section, the relevant function of encryption technologies, restricting access to information (called confidentiality), is discussed. In the second section, an overview of some governmental policies and practices impacting these technologies is provided. This continues with a discussion of the case law on the rights to privacy, data protection and freedom of expression, arguing that these rights are not only about ensuring lawful access by governments to protected information, but also about preventing unlawful access by others. And because encryption technologies are an important technology to reduce the risk of this unlawful access, it is then proposed that this risk is central to the assessment of governance measures in the field of encryption technologies. The article concludes by recommending that states perform an in-depth assessement of this when proposing new measures, and that courts when reviewing them also place the risk of unlawful access central to the analysis of interference and proportionality.},
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Encryption technologies are a fundamental building block of modern digital infrastructure, but plans to curb these technologies continue to spring up. Even in the European Union, where their application is by now firmly embedded in legislation, lawmakers are again calling for measures which would impact these technologies. One of the most important arguments in this debate are human rights, most notably the rights to privacy and to freedom of expression. And although some authors have in the past explored how encryption technologies support human rights, this connection is not yet firmly grounded in an analysis of European human rights case law. This contribution aims to fill this gap, developing a framework for assessing restrictions of encryption technologies under the rights to privacy and freedom of expression as protected under the European Convention of Human Rights (the Convention) and the Charter of Fundamental rights in the European Union (the Charter). In the first section, the relevant function of encryption technologies, restricting access to information (called confidentiality), is discussed. In the second section, an overview of some governmental policies and practices impacting these technologies is provided. This continues with a discussion of the case law on the rights to privacy, data protection and freedom of expression, arguing that these rights are not only about ensuring lawful access by governments to protected information, but also about preventing unlawful access by others. And because encryption technologies are an important technology to reduce the risk of this unlawful access, it is then proposed that this risk is central to the assessment of governance measures in the field of encryption technologies. The article concludes by recommending that states perform an in-depth assessement of this when proposing new measures, and that courts when reviewing them also place the risk of unlawful access central to the analysis of interference and proportionality.
Senftleben, M.; Quintais, J.; Meiring, A.
In: 2023.
@article{nokey,
title = {Outsourcing Human Rights Obligations and Concealing Human Rights Deficits: The Example of Monetizing User-Generated Content Under the CDSM Directive and the Digital Services Act},
author = {Senftleben, M. and Quintais, J. and Meiring, A.},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4421150},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-26},
abstract = {With the shift from the traditional safe harbor for hosting to statutory content filtering and licensing obligations, EU copyright law has substantially curtailed the freedom of users to upload and share their content creations. Seeking to avoid overbroad inroads into freedom of expression, EU law obliges online platforms and the creative industry to take into account human rights when coordinating their content filtering actions. Platforms must also establish complaint and redress procedures for users. The European Commission will initiate stakeholder dialogues to identify best practices. These “safety valves” in the legislative package, however, are mere fig leaves. Instead of safeguarding human rights, the EU legislator outsources human rights obligations to the platform industry. At the same time, the burden of policing content moderation systems is imposed on users who are unlikely to bring complaints in each individual case. The new legislative design in the EU will thus “conceal” human rights violations instead of bringing them to light. Nonetheless, the DSA rests on the same \textendash highly problematic \textendash approach.
Against this background, the paper discusses the weakening \textendash and potential loss \textendash of fundamental freedoms as a result of the departure from the traditional notice-and-takedown approach. Adding a new element to the ongoing debate on content licensing and filtering, the analysis will devote particular attention to the fact that EU law, for the most part, has left untouched the private power of platforms to determine the “house rules” governing the most popular copyright-owner reaction to detected matches between protected works and content uploads: the (algorithmic) monetization of that content. Addressing the “legal vacuum” in the field of content monetization, the analysis explores outsourcing and concealment risks in this unregulated space. Focusing on large-scale platforms for user-generated content, such as YouTube, Instagram and TikTok, two normative problems come to the fore: (1) the fact that rightholders, when opting for monetization, de facto monetize not only their own rights but also the creative input of users; (2) the fact that user creativity remains unremunerated as long as the monetization option is only available to rightholders. As a result of this configuration, the monetization mechanism disregards users’ right to (intellectual) property and discriminates against user creativity. Against this background, we discuss whether the DSA provisions that seek to ensure transparency of content moderation actions and terms and conditions offer useful sources of information that could empower users. Moreover, we raise the question whether the detailed regulation of platform actions in the DSA may resolve the described human rights dilemmas to some extent.},
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With the shift from the traditional safe harbor for hosting to statutory content filtering and licensing obligations, EU copyright law has substantially curtailed the freedom of users to upload and share their content creations. Seeking to avoid overbroad inroads into freedom of expression, EU law obliges online platforms and the creative industry to take into account human rights when coordinating their content filtering actions. Platforms must also establish complaint and redress procedures for users. The European Commission will initiate stakeholder dialogues to identify best practices. These “safety valves” in the legislative package, however, are mere fig leaves. Instead of safeguarding human rights, the EU legislator outsources human rights obligations to the platform industry. At the same time, the burden of policing content moderation systems is imposed on users who are unlikely to bring complaints in each individual case. The new legislative design in the EU will thus “conceal” human rights violations instead of bringing them to light. Nonetheless, the DSA rests on the same – highly problematic – approach.
Against this background, the paper discusses the weakening – and potential loss – of fundamental freedoms as a result of the departure from the traditional notice-and-takedown approach. Adding a new element to the ongoing debate on content licensing and filtering, the analysis will devote particular attention to the fact that EU law, for the most part, has left untouched the private power of platforms to determine the “house rules” governing the most popular copyright-owner reaction to detected matches between protected works and content uploads: the (algorithmic) monetization of that content. Addressing the “legal vacuum” in the field of content monetization, the analysis explores outsourcing and concealment risks in this unregulated space. Focusing on large-scale platforms for user-generated content, such as YouTube, Instagram and TikTok, two normative problems come to the fore: (1) the fact that rightholders, when opting for monetization, de facto monetize not only their own rights but also the creative input of users; (2) the fact that user creativity remains unremunerated as long as the monetization option is only available to rightholders. As a result of this configuration, the monetization mechanism disregards users’ right to (intellectual) property and discriminates against user creativity. Against this background, we discuss whether the DSA provisions that seek to ensure transparency of content moderation actions and terms and conditions offer useful sources of information that could empower users. Moreover, we raise the question whether the detailed regulation of platform actions in the DSA may resolve the described human rights dilemmas to some extent.
Hins, A.
Annotatie bij Rechtbank Noord-Holland 28 december 2022 (Hendriks/Unibail Rodamco Nederland Winkels B.V.) Tijdschriftartikel
In: Mediaforum, ed. 1, nr. 4, pp. 49-51, 2023.
@article{nokey,
title = {Annotatie bij Rechtbank Noord-Holland 28 december 2022 (Hendriks/Unibail Rodamco Nederland Winkels B.V.)},
author = {Hins, A.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/annotatie_mediaforum_2023_nr4/},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-25},
journal = {Mediaforum},
number = {4},
issue = {1},
pages = {49-51},
abstract = {De professionele nieuwsfotograaf Hendriks wil foto's maken in een groot winkelcentrum, maar krijgt daarvoor geen toestemming van de exploitant Unibail Rodamco. Hendriks vordert bij de rechtbank een verklaring voor recht dat het weigeren van de toestemming onrechtmatig is. De rechtbank wijst de vordering af omdat Hendriks nog wel foto's mag maken met niet-professionele apparatuur, zoals een mobiele telefoon. In de annotatie wordt ingegaan op de horizontale werking van artikel 10 EVRM en de botsing van diverse grondrechten: de vrijheid van nieuwsgaring, het recht op eigendom, de vrijheid van onderneming en het recht op privacy.},
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De professionele nieuwsfotograaf Hendriks wil foto's maken in een groot winkelcentrum, maar krijgt daarvoor geen toestemming van de exploitant Unibail Rodamco. Hendriks vordert bij de rechtbank een verklaring voor recht dat het weigeren van de toestemming onrechtmatig is. De rechtbank wijst de vordering af omdat Hendriks nog wel foto's mag maken met niet-professionele apparatuur, zoals een mobiele telefoon. In de annotatie wordt ingegaan op de horizontale werking van artikel 10 EVRM en de botsing van diverse grondrechten: de vrijheid van nieuwsgaring, het recht op eigendom, de vrijheid van onderneming en het recht op privacy.
van Daalen, O.
Fundamental rights assessment of the framework for detection orders under the CSAM proposal Technisch verslag
2023.
@techreport{nokey,
title = {Fundamental rights assessment of the framework for detection orders under the CSAM proposal},
author = {van Daalen, O.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/csamreport/},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-22},
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Dobber, T.; Kruikemeier, S.; Helberger, N.; Goodman, E.
Shielding citizens? Understanding the impact of political advertisement transparency information Tijdschriftartikel
In: New Media & Society, 2023.
@article{nokey,
title = {Shielding citizens? Understanding the impact of political advertisement transparency information},
author = {Dobber, T. and Kruikemeier, S. and Helberger, N. and Goodman, E.},
doi = {10.1177/14614448231157640},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-21},
journal = {New Media \& Society},
abstract = {Online targeted advertising leverages an information asymmetry between the advertiser and the recipient. Policymakers in the European Union and the United States aim to decrease this asymmetry by requiring information transparency information alongside political advertisements, in the hope of activating citizens’ persuasion knowledge. However, the proposed regulations all present different directions with regard to the required content of transparency information. Consequently, not all proposed interventions will be (equally) effective. Moreover, there is a chance that transparent information has additional consequences, such as increasing privacy concerns or decreasing advertising effectiveness. Using an online experiment (N = 1331), this study addresses these challenges and finds that two regulatory interventions (DSA and HAA) increase persuasion knowledge, while the chance of raising privacy concerns or lowering advertisement effectiveness is present but slim. Results suggest transparency information interventions have some promise, but at the same time underline the limitations of user-facing transparency interventions.},
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Online targeted advertising leverages an information asymmetry between the advertiser and the recipient. Policymakers in the European Union and the United States aim to decrease this asymmetry by requiring information transparency information alongside political advertisements, in the hope of activating citizens’ persuasion knowledge. However, the proposed regulations all present different directions with regard to the required content of transparency information. Consequently, not all proposed interventions will be (equally) effective. Moreover, there is a chance that transparent information has additional consequences, such as increasing privacy concerns or decreasing advertising effectiveness. Using an online experiment (N = 1331), this study addresses these challenges and finds that two regulatory interventions (DSA and HAA) increase persuasion knowledge, while the chance of raising privacy concerns or lowering advertisement effectiveness is present but slim. Results suggest transparency information interventions have some promise, but at the same time underline the limitations of user-facing transparency interventions.
Dommering, E.
Annotatie bij Hoge Raad 18 oktober 2022 (Chohan) Tijdschriftartikel
In: Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, ed. 12, nr. 118, pp. 2088-2090, 2023.
@article{nokey,
title = {Annotatie bij Hoge Raad 18 oktober 2022 (Chohan)},
author = {Dommering, E.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/annotatie_nj_2023_118/},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-04-20},
journal = {Nederlandse Jurisprudentie},
number = {118},
issue = {12},
pages = {2088-2090},
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Dommering, E.
Annotatie bij Hoge Raad 7 oktober 2022 (X / ROC-Nijmegen) Tijdschriftartikel
In: Mediaforum, ed. 1, nr. 3, pp. 43-45, 2023.
@article{nokey,
title = {Annotatie bij Hoge Raad 7 oktober 2022 (X / ROC-Nijmegen)},
author = {Dommering, E.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/annotatie_mediaforum_2023_1/},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-03-30},
journal = {Mediaforum},
number = {3},
issue = {1},
pages = {43-45},
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Irion, K.; Kaminski, M.; Yakovleva, S.
Privacy Peg, Trade Hole: Why We (Still) Shouldn’t Put Data Privacy in Trade Law Online
2023, bezocht: 28.03.2023.
@online{Irion2023,
title = {Privacy Peg, Trade Hole: Why We (Still) Shouldn’t Put Data Privacy in Trade Law},
author = {Irion, K. and Kaminski, M. and Yakovleva, S.},
url = {https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2023/03/27/irion-kaminski-yakovleva/},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-03-28},
urldate = {2023-03-28},
abstract = {A Response to Profs. Anupam Chander \& Paul Schwartz’s Privacy and/or Trade.
Some principles are not well suited for negotiation through the international trade regime. Or rather, the international trade regime has never been the right forum for negotiating or enforcing human rights. The World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) current approach to data privacy law both instantiates and illustrates this: it brackets data privacy as something trade law cannot well address, while illustrating the ways in which trade law superimposes its prioritization of trade liberalization atop other public values. Trade’s core framing prioritizes economic over human rights values. Beyond ensuring non-discriminatory treatment, trade law remains, in our view, the wrong place for both defining and enforcing rules on cross-border flows of personal data. Thus, while we welcome with open arms the thoughtful attention Professors Anupam Chander and Paul Schwartz pay to the current transnational struggle over data flows and digital trade, we cannot join in their optimism that trade law is the right forum for arbitrating it. },
howpublished = {University of Chicago Law Review Online, 27 March 2023},
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A Response to Profs. Anupam Chander & Paul Schwartz’s Privacy and/or Trade.
Some principles are not well suited for negotiation through the international trade regime. Or rather, the international trade regime has never been the right forum for negotiating or enforcing human rights. The World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) current approach to data privacy law both instantiates and illustrates this: it brackets data privacy as something trade law cannot well address, while illustrating the ways in which trade law superimposes its prioritization of trade liberalization atop other public values. Trade’s core framing prioritizes economic over human rights values. Beyond ensuring non-discriminatory treatment, trade law remains, in our view, the wrong place for both defining and enforcing rules on cross-border flows of personal data. Thus, while we welcome with open arms the thoughtful attention Professors Anupam Chander and Paul Schwartz pay to the current transnational struggle over data flows and digital trade, we cannot join in their optimism that trade law is the right forum for arbitrating it.
Dommering, E.
Polen is plotseling de verdediger van de Europese grondwet. Een beschouwing over de zaak Polen/Europees Parlement: HvJ EU 22 april 2022, zaak C-401/19 Tijdschriftartikel
In: Auteursrecht, vol. 2022, ed. 4, pp. 219-227, 2023.
@article{nokey,
title = {Polen is plotseling de verdediger van de Europese grondwet. Een beschouwing over de zaak Polen/Europees Parlement: HvJ EU 22 april 2022, zaak C-401/19},
author = {Dommering, E.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/nl/auteursrecht_2022_4/},
year = {2023},
date = {2023-01-31},
urldate = {2023-01-31},
journal = {Auteursrecht},
volume = {2022},
issue = {4},
pages = {219-227},
abstract = {Dit artikel bevat een inleiding waarin de verandering in de communicatienetwerkomgeving wordt geschetst om te verduidelijken dat het systeem van de e-Commercerichtlijn niet goed meer past, maar waar toch nog dikwijls aan wordt gerefereerd (par. 1). Vervolgens wordt stilgestaan bij de constitutionele toetsing die het VEU introduceert (par. 2). Hiermee hangt samen dat een abstracte constitutionele toetsing aan de beperkingsclausules van het Handvest ingewikkeld is, een aspect dat in deze vorm in het auteursrecht nog niet eerder aan de orde is geweest (par. 3). Dat een dergelijke constitutionele
toetsing heel verschillend kan worden aangepakt, blijkt uit de conclusie van de A-G en het Hof, die daarom tegenover de aanpak van het Hof wordt gezet (par. 4 en 5). Het artikel rondt af met een analyse dat de inzet van de zaak is vrijheid van meningsuiting, maar dat het resultaat is meer overheidsinvloed op de filtertechnieken die censuur moeten voorkomen (par. 6).},
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Dit artikel bevat een inleiding waarin de verandering in de communicatienetwerkomgeving wordt geschetst om te verduidelijken dat het systeem van de e-Commercerichtlijn niet goed meer past, maar waar toch nog dikwijls aan wordt gerefereerd (par. 1). Vervolgens wordt stilgestaan bij de constitutionele toetsing die het VEU introduceert (par. 2). Hiermee hangt samen dat een abstracte constitutionele toetsing aan de beperkingsclausules van het Handvest ingewikkeld is, een aspect dat in deze vorm in het auteursrecht nog niet eerder aan de orde is geweest (par. 3). Dat een dergelijke constitutionele
toetsing heel verschillend kan worden aangepakt, blijkt uit de conclusie van de A-G en het Hof, die daarom tegenover de aanpak van het Hof wordt gezet (par. 4 en 5). Het artikel rondt af met een analyse dat de inzet van de zaak is vrijheid van meningsuiting, maar dat het resultaat is meer overheidsinvloed op de filtertechnieken die censuur moeten voorkomen (par. 6).
toetsing heel verschillend kan worden aangepakt, blijkt uit de conclusie van de A-G en het Hof, die daarom tegenover de aanpak van het Hof wordt gezet (par. 4 en 5). Het artikel rondt af met een analyse dat de inzet van de zaak is vrijheid van meningsuiting, maar dat het resultaat is meer overheidsinvloed op de filtertechnieken die censuur moeten voorkomen (par. 6).
Fahy, R.; Voorhoof, D.
Freedom of Expression and the EU’s Ban on Russia Today: A Dangerous Rubicon Crossed Tijdschriftartikel
In: Communications Law, vol. 27, ed. 4, pp. 186-193, 2022.
@article{nokey,
title = {Freedom of Expression and the EU’s Ban on Russia Today: A Dangerous Rubicon Crossed},
author = {Fahy, R. and Voorhoof, D.},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4322452},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-12-22},
urldate = {2022-12-22},
journal = {Communications Law},
volume = {27},
issue = {4},
pages = {186-193},
abstract = {In RT France v Council, the General Court of the European Union found that the ban on RT France in the EU did not violate the right to freedom of expression and media freedom, under Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Notably, the General Court sought to apply principles from case law of the European Court of Human Rights and international human rights law. This article argues that there are serious questions to be raised over the General Court’s reasoning in RT France, and the judgment arguably represents a deeply problematic application of European and international free expression principles.},
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In RT France v Council, the General Court of the European Union found that the ban on RT France in the EU did not violate the right to freedom of expression and media freedom, under Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Notably, the General Court sought to apply principles from case law of the European Court of Human Rights and international human rights law. This article argues that there are serious questions to be raised over the General Court’s reasoning in RT France, and the judgment arguably represents a deeply problematic application of European and international free expression principles.
Dommering, E.
Annotatie Hoge Raad 3 december 2021 (Hoist Finance AB) Tijdschriftartikel
In: Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, ed. 37/38/39, nr. 258, pp. 4640-4642, 2022.
@article{nokey,
title = {Annotatie Hoge Raad 3 december 2021 (Hoist Finance AB)},
author = {Dommering, E.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/annotatie_nj_2022_258/},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-11-28},
journal = {Nederlandse Jurisprudentie},
number = {258},
issue = {37/38/39},
pages = {4640-4642},
abstract = {Prejudici\"{e}le beslissing op voet art. 392 Rv. Algemene verordening gegevensbescherming (AVG). Rechtsgrond verwerking persoonsgegevens in kredietregistratiestelsel BKR; recht op gegevenswissing; recht op bezwaar.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
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Prejudiciële beslissing op voet art. 392 Rv. Algemene verordening gegevensbescherming (AVG). Rechtsgrond verwerking persoonsgegevens in kredietregistratiestelsel BKR; recht op gegevenswissing; recht op bezwaar.
Dommering, E.
Annotatie bij Hoge Raad 25 februari 2022 (Google) Tijdschriftartikel
In: Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, ed. 37/38/39, nr. 259, pp. 4708-4709, 2022.
@article{nokey,
title = {Annotatie bij Hoge Raad 25 februari 2022 (Google)},
author = {Dommering, E.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/annotatie_nj_2022_259/},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-11-28},
journal = {Nederlandse Jurisprudentie},
number = {259},
issue = {37/38/39},
pages = {4708-4709},
abstract = {Privacyrecht. Algemene Verordening Gegevensbescherming (AVG); verzoek verwijdering zoekresultaten; gevoelige persoonsgegevens (art. 10 AVG); maatstaf. Proceskosten in AVG-zaken; doeltreffende voorziening (art. 79 AVG en art. 47
Handvest Grondrechten EU).},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
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}
Privacyrecht. Algemene Verordening Gegevensbescherming (AVG); verzoek verwijdering zoekresultaten; gevoelige persoonsgegevens (art. 10 AVG); maatstaf. Proceskosten in AVG-zaken; doeltreffende voorziening (art. 79 AVG en art. 47
Handvest Grondrechten EU).
Handvest Grondrechten EU).
Quintais, J.; Appelman, N.; Fahy, R.
Using Terms and Conditions to Apply Fundamental Rights to Content Moderation Tijdschriftartikel Komende
In: German Law Journal, Komende.
@article{nokey,
title = {Using Terms and Conditions to Apply Fundamental Rights to Content Moderation},
author = {Quintais, J. and Appelman, N. and Fahy, R.},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4286147
https://osf.io/f2n7m/},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-11-25},
journal = {German Law Journal},
abstract = {Large online platforms provide an unprecedented means for exercising freedom of expression online and wield enormous power over public participation in the online democratic space. However, it is increasingly clear that their systems, where (automated) content moderation decisions are taken based on a platform's terms and conditions (T\&Cs), are fundamentally broken. Content moderation systems have been said to undermine freedom of expression, especially where important public interest speech ends up suppressed, such as speech by minority and marginalized groups. Indeed, these content moderation systems have been criticized for their overly vague rules of operation, inconsistent enforcement, and an overdependence on automation. Therefore, in order to better protect freedom of expression online, international human rights bodies and civil society organizations have argued that platforms “should incorporate directly” principles of fundamental rights law into their T\&Cs. Under EU law, and apart from a rule in the Terrorist Content Regulation, platforms had until recently no explicit obligation to incorporate fundamental rights into their T\&Cs. However, an important provision in the Digital Services Act (DSA) will change this. Crucially, Article 14 DSA lays down new rules on how platforms can enforce their T\&Cs, including that platforms must have “due regard” to the “fundamental rights” of users under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this article, we critically examine the topic of enforceability of fundamental rights via T\&Cs through the prism of Article 14 DSA. We ask whether this provision requires platforms to apply EU fundamental rights law and to what extent this may curb the power of Big Tech over online speech. We conclude that Article 14 will make it possible, in principle, to establish the indirect horizontal effect of fundamental rights in the relationship between online platforms and their users. But in order for the application and enforcement of T\&Cs to take due regard of fundamental rights, Article 14 must be operationalized within the framework of the international and European fundamental rights standards, and therefore allowing Article 14 to fulfil its revolutionary potential.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {forthcoming},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Large online platforms provide an unprecedented means for exercising freedom of expression online and wield enormous power over public participation in the online democratic space. However, it is increasingly clear that their systems, where (automated) content moderation decisions are taken based on a platform's terms and conditions (T&Cs), are fundamentally broken. Content moderation systems have been said to undermine freedom of expression, especially where important public interest speech ends up suppressed, such as speech by minority and marginalized groups. Indeed, these content moderation systems have been criticized for their overly vague rules of operation, inconsistent enforcement, and an overdependence on automation. Therefore, in order to better protect freedom of expression online, international human rights bodies and civil society organizations have argued that platforms “should incorporate directly” principles of fundamental rights law into their T&Cs. Under EU law, and apart from a rule in the Terrorist Content Regulation, platforms had until recently no explicit obligation to incorporate fundamental rights into their T&Cs. However, an important provision in the Digital Services Act (DSA) will change this. Crucially, Article 14 DSA lays down new rules on how platforms can enforce their T&Cs, including that platforms must have “due regard” to the “fundamental rights” of users under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this article, we critically examine the topic of enforceability of fundamental rights via T&Cs through the prism of Article 14 DSA. We ask whether this provision requires platforms to apply EU fundamental rights law and to what extent this may curb the power of Big Tech over online speech. We conclude that Article 14 will make it possible, in principle, to establish the indirect horizontal effect of fundamental rights in the relationship between online platforms and their users. But in order for the application and enforcement of T&Cs to take due regard of fundamental rights, Article 14 must be operationalized within the framework of the international and European fundamental rights standards, and therefore allowing Article 14 to fulfil its revolutionary potential.
van Daalen, O.
Testimony for PEGA hearing on spyware and fundamental rights Tijdschriftartikel
In: 2022.
@article{nokey,
title = {Testimony for PEGA hearing on spyware and fundamental rights},
author = {van Daalen, O.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/testimony_pega/},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-10-27},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
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Voorhoof, D.; McGonagle, T.
Freedom of expression, the Media and Journalists: Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights Boek
2022, ISBN: 9789287184351, (IRIS Themes, vol. III, 7th edition, European Audiovisual Observatory, Strasbourg).
@book{nokey,
title = {Freedom of expression, the Media and Journalists: Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights},
author = {Voorhoof, D. and McGonagle, T.},
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isbn = { 9789287184351},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-08-26},
abstract = {This e-book provides valuable insights into the European Court of Human Rights’ extensive case-law on freedom of expression and media and journalistic freedoms. The first six editions of the e-book (2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2020 and 2021) have proved hugely successful. The new seventh edition summarises over 360 judgments or decisions by the Court and provides hyperlinks to the full text of each of the summarised judgments or decisions (via HUDOC, the Court's online case-law database).},
note = {IRIS Themes, vol. III, 7th edition, European Audiovisual Observatory, Strasbourg},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
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This e-book provides valuable insights into the European Court of Human Rights’ extensive case-law on freedom of expression and media and journalistic freedoms. The first six editions of the e-book (2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2020 and 2021) have proved hugely successful. The new seventh edition summarises over 360 judgments or decisions by the Court and provides hyperlinks to the full text of each of the summarised judgments or decisions (via HUDOC, the Court's online case-law database).
Hins, A.
Opinie: Staatspropaganda en uitingsvrijheid Tijdschriftartikel
In: Mediaforum, vol. 34, ed. 2, pp. 45, 2022.
@article{nokey,
title = {Opinie: Staatspropaganda en uitingsvrijheid},
author = {Hins, A.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/opinie_mediaforum_2022_2/},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-08-25},
journal = {Mediaforum},
volume = {34},
issue = {2},
pages = {45},
abstract = {Op 10 januari 2022 is de Europese Commissie een openbare raadpleging gestart inzake een nieuwe verordening op basis van art. 114 VWEU, genaamd ‘Europese wet inzake mediavrijheid. ’ Deze opinie bepleit om in de te toekomstige verordening vast te leggen dat publieke mediadiensten binnen de EU onafhankelijk moeten functioneren van de politieke macht. Het aanleggen van dezelfde criteria voor het doorgeven van programma’s die elders zijn uitgezonden is echter onevenredig.},
keywords = {},
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Op 10 januari 2022 is de Europese Commissie een openbare raadpleging gestart inzake een nieuwe verordening op basis van art. 114 VWEU, genaamd ‘Europese wet inzake mediavrijheid. ’ Deze opinie bepleit om in de te toekomstige verordening vast te leggen dat publieke mediadiensten binnen de EU onafhankelijk moeten functioneren van de politieke macht. Het aanleggen van dezelfde criteria voor het doorgeven van programma’s die elders zijn uitgezonden is echter onevenredig.
Giannopoulou, A.
Allocating Control in Decentralised Identity Management Tijdschriftartikel
In: European Review of Digital Administration & Law - Erdal, vol. 2021, ed. 2, pp. 75-87, 2022.
@article{nokey,
title = {Allocating Control in Decentralised Identity Management},
author = {Giannopoulou, A.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/erdal_2021_2/},
doi = {10.53136/97912599475299},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-07-21},
urldate = {2022-07-21},
journal = {European Review of Digital Administration \& Law - Erdal},
volume = {2021},
issue = {2},
pages = {75-87},
abstract = {Creating legal identity in the digital space involves the challenging task of addressing the datarelated responsibilities and obligations for data governance and data protection (by design and by default) to name a few. Substantially, it also requires the datafication of legal identity which means transposing all its properties and foundational traits inits corresponding data expressions and relations. As (digital) legal identity evolves from the fringes of purely technology-related challenges towards the legal and socio-technical, state institutions \textendashsovereignly responsible for delivering digital legal identities to citizens\textendash are acknowledging the polyvalent, non-monolithic, and relational characters of identitiesand they explore appropriate architectures. This paper sets out to explore the institutional turn towards decentralized digital identities. The claims surrounding these digital identities raise high hopes for the cross border digital identity provisioning being data protection and privacy compliant, technologically secure, and user-centric. This paper attempts to explore how the relevant accountable actors \textendashas recognized through the data protection normative framework\textendash are formed around the technological identity infrastructure.We highlight and examine the conflict between the European proposals on the provision of digital identity infrastructures through decentralized architectures and the concepts of data controllership in the GDPR.
},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
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Creating legal identity in the digital space involves the challenging task of addressing the datarelated responsibilities and obligations for data governance and data protection (by design and by default) to name a few. Substantially, it also requires the datafication of legal identity which means transposing all its properties and foundational traits inits corresponding data expressions and relations. As (digital) legal identity evolves from the fringes of purely technology-related challenges towards the legal and socio-technical, state institutions –sovereignly responsible for delivering digital legal identities to citizens– are acknowledging the polyvalent, non-monolithic, and relational characters of identitiesand they explore appropriate architectures. This paper sets out to explore the institutional turn towards decentralized digital identities. The claims surrounding these digital identities raise high hopes for the cross border digital identity provisioning being data protection and privacy compliant, technologically secure, and user-centric. This paper attempts to explore how the relevant accountable actors –as recognized through the data protection normative framework– are formed around the technological identity infrastructure.We highlight and examine the conflict between the European proposals on the provision of digital identity infrastructures through decentralized architectures and the concepts of data controllership in the GDPR.
McGonagle, T.
Another string to the bow of media freedom: An analysis of the Communiqués of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (2014 – 2022) Technisch verslag
2022, (Study commissioned by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, OSCE, Vienna).
@techreport{nokey,
title = {Another string to the bow of media freedom: An analysis of the Communiqu\'{e}s of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (2014 \textendash 2022)},
author = {McGonagle, T.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/nl/another_string_to_the_bow_of_media_freedom/},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-07-21},
abstract = {Since 2014, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media has issued 20 communiqu\'{e}s on a range of different themes relating to freedom of expression and information; media and internet freedom; and the safety and freedoms of journalists and other (media) actors. They were introduced as a new form of output that would have more depth and impact than regular
press releases or statements. This study provides an analysis of this corpus of communiqu\'{e}s. It examines their aims, instruments and formats used by the Representative to make political interventions and develop standpoints. The thematic analysis is grouped into the following rough categories: 1) enduring threats to freedom of the media and freedom of expression; 2) emerging threats to freedom of the media and freedom of expression; and 3) signature themes of the Office of the Representative. The signature themes are open journalism and safety of female journalists online \textendash the focuses of two recent flagship projects by the Office of the Representative. The picture that emerges from the analysis is one of complementary focuses and consistent approaches. Nevertheless, the conclusions offer a few modest recommendations to make future communiqu\'{e}s more distinctly recognisable as such and to further enhance the consistency across the growing corpus of communiqu\'{e}s.},
note = {Study commissioned by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, OSCE, Vienna},
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pubstate = {published},
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Since 2014, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media has issued 20 communiqués on a range of different themes relating to freedom of expression and information; media and internet freedom; and the safety and freedoms of journalists and other (media) actors. They were introduced as a new form of output that would have more depth and impact than regular
press releases or statements. This study provides an analysis of this corpus of communiqués. It examines their aims, instruments and formats used by the Representative to make political interventions and develop standpoints. The thematic analysis is grouped into the following rough categories: 1) enduring threats to freedom of the media and freedom of expression; 2) emerging threats to freedom of the media and freedom of expression; and 3) signature themes of the Office of the Representative. The signature themes are open journalism and safety of female journalists online – the focuses of two recent flagship projects by the Office of the Representative. The picture that emerges from the analysis is one of complementary focuses and consistent approaches. Nevertheless, the conclusions offer a few modest recommendations to make future communiqués more distinctly recognisable as such and to further enhance the consistency across the growing corpus of communiqués.
press releases or statements. This study provides an analysis of this corpus of communiqués. It examines their aims, instruments and formats used by the Representative to make political interventions and develop standpoints. The thematic analysis is grouped into the following rough categories: 1) enduring threats to freedom of the media and freedom of expression; 2) emerging threats to freedom of the media and freedom of expression; and 3) signature themes of the Office of the Representative. The signature themes are open journalism and safety of female journalists online – the focuses of two recent flagship projects by the Office of the Representative. The picture that emerges from the analysis is one of complementary focuses and consistent approaches. Nevertheless, the conclusions offer a few modest recommendations to make future communiqués more distinctly recognisable as such and to further enhance the consistency across the growing corpus of communiqués.
van Daalen, O.
In defense of offense: information security research under the right to science Tijdschriftartikel
In: Computer Law & Security Review, vol. 46, 2022.
@article{nokey,
title = {In defense of offense: information security research under the right to science},
author = {van Daalen, O.},
doi = {10.1016/j.clsr.2022.105706},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-07-12},
journal = {Computer Law \& Security Review},
volume = {46},
abstract = {Information security is something you do, not something you have. It's a recurring process of finding weaknesses and fixing them, only for the next weakness to be discovered, and fixed, and so on. Yet, European Union rules in this field are not built around this cycle of making and breaking: doing offensive information security research is not always legal, and doubts about its legality can have a chilling effect. At the same time, the results of such research are sometimes not used to allow others to take defensive measures, but instead are used to attack. In this article, I review whether states have an obligation under the right to science and the right to communications freedom to develop governance which addresses these two issues. I first discuss the characteristics of this cycle of making and breaking. I then discuss the rules in the European Union with regard to this cycle. Then I discuss how the right to science and the right to communications freedom under the European Convention for Human Rights , the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights apply to this domain. I then conclude that states must recognise a right to research information security vulnerabilities, but that this right comes with a duty of researchers to disclose their findings in a way which strengthens information security.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Information security is something you do, not something you have. It's a recurring process of finding weaknesses and fixing them, only for the next weakness to be discovered, and fixed, and so on. Yet, European Union rules in this field are not built around this cycle of making and breaking: doing offensive information security research is not always legal, and doubts about its legality can have a chilling effect. At the same time, the results of such research are sometimes not used to allow others to take defensive measures, but instead are used to attack. In this article, I review whether states have an obligation under the right to science and the right to communications freedom to develop governance which addresses these two issues. I first discuss the characteristics of this cycle of making and breaking. I then discuss the rules in the European Union with regard to this cycle. Then I discuss how the right to science and the right to communications freedom under the European Convention for Human Rights , the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights apply to this domain. I then conclude that states must recognise a right to research information security vulnerabilities, but that this right comes with a duty of researchers to disclose their findings in a way which strengthens information security.
Mil, J. van; Quintais, J.
A Matter of (Joint) control? Virtual assistants and the general data protection regulation Tijdschriftartikel
In: Computer Law & Security Review, vol. 45, 2022.
@article{nokey,
title = {A Matter of (Joint) control? Virtual assistants and the general data protection regulation},
author = {Mil, J. van and Quintais, J.},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2022.105689},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-06-16},
journal = {Computer Law \& Security Review},
volume = {45},
abstract = {This article provides an overview and critical examination of the rules for determining who qualifies as controller or joint controller under the General Data Protection Regulation. Using Google Assistant \textendash an artificial intelligence-driven virtual assistant \textendash as a case study, we argue that these rules are overreaching and difficult to apply in the present-day information society and Internet of Things environments. First, as a consequence of recent developments in case law and supervisory guidance, these rules lead to a complex and ambiguous test to determine (joint) control. Second, due to advances in technological applications and business models, it is increasingly challenging to apply such rules to contemporary processing operations. In particular, as illustrated by the Google Assistant, individuals will likely be qualified as joint controllers, together with Google and also third-party developers, for at least the collection and possible transmission of other individuals’ personal data via the virtual assistant. Third, we identify follow-on issues relating to the apportionment of responsibilities between joint controllers and the effective and complete protection of data subjects. We conclude by questioning whether the framework for determining who qualifies as controller or joint controller is future-proof and normatively desirable.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
This article provides an overview and critical examination of the rules for determining who qualifies as controller or joint controller under the General Data Protection Regulation. Using Google Assistant – an artificial intelligence-driven virtual assistant – as a case study, we argue that these rules are overreaching and difficult to apply in the present-day information society and Internet of Things environments. First, as a consequence of recent developments in case law and supervisory guidance, these rules lead to a complex and ambiguous test to determine (joint) control. Second, due to advances in technological applications and business models, it is increasingly challenging to apply such rules to contemporary processing operations. In particular, as illustrated by the Google Assistant, individuals will likely be qualified as joint controllers, together with Google and also third-party developers, for at least the collection and possible transmission of other individuals’ personal data via the virtual assistant. Third, we identify follow-on issues relating to the apportionment of responsibilities between joint controllers and the effective and complete protection of data subjects. We conclude by questioning whether the framework for determining who qualifies as controller or joint controller is future-proof and normatively desirable.
Janssen, H.; Seng Ah Lee, M.; Singh, J.; Cobbe, J.
Defining the scope of AI ADM system risk assessment Boek Hoofstuk
In: Research handbook on EU data protection law, E. Kosta, R. Leenes & I. Kamara (ed.), Hoofstuk 16, pp. 405-434, Edgar Elgar Publishing, 2022.
@inbook{nokey,
title = {Defining the scope of AI ADM system risk assessment},
author = {Janssen, H. and Seng Ah Lee, M. and Singh, J. and Cobbe, J.},
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date = {2022-06-16},
booktitle = {Research handbook on EU data protection law, E. Kosta, R. Leenes \& I. Kamara (ed.)},
pages = {405-434},
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chapter = {16},
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Leerssen, P.
Annotatie bij Rb Noord-Holland 6 oktober 2021 (Kamerlid / LinkedIn Ierland & LinkedIn Nederland) Tijdschriftartikel
In: Computerrecht, ed. 3, nr. 97, pp. 228-230, 2022.
@article{nokey,
title = {Annotatie bij Rb Noord-Holland 6 oktober 2021 (Kamerlid / LinkedIn Ierland \& LinkedIn Nederland)},
author = {Leerssen, P.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/annotatie_computerrecht_2022_97/},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-06-16},
journal = {Computerrecht},
number = {97},
issue = {3},
pages = {228-230},
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Dommering, E.
Naar een algemeen transparantiebeginsel? : Bespreking van het preadvies van A.W.G.J. Buijze voor de VAR 2022 Tijdschriftartikel
In: Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Bestuursrecht, ed. 5, nr. 141, pp. 265-271, 2022.
@article{nokey,
title = {Naar een algemeen transparantiebeginsel? : Bespreking van het preadvies van A.W.G.J. Buijze voor de VAR 2022},
author = {Dommering, E.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/ntb_2022_5_141/},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-06-07},
urldate = {2022-06-07},
journal = {Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Bestuursrecht},
number = {141},
issue = {5},
pages = {265-271},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Quintais, J.
Between Filters and Fundamental Rights: How the Court of Justice saved Article 17 in C-401/19 - Poland v. Parliament and Council Tijdschriftartikel
In: Verfassungsblog, 2022.
@article{nokey,
title = {Between Filters and Fundamental Rights: How the Court of Justice saved Article 17 in C-401/19 - Poland v. Parliament and Council},
author = {Quintais, J.},
url = {https://verfassungsblog.de/filters-poland/?s=09},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-05-16},
journal = {Verfassungsblog},
abstract = {On 26 April 2022, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU or Court) delivered its much awaited judgement in Case C-401/19 \textendash Poland v Parliament and Council. The case focuses on the validity of Article 17 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (CDSMD) in light of fundamental rights. The judgment marks the climax of a turbulent journey in the area of copyright law, with potential implications for the future of platform regulation and content moderation in EU law.},
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On 26 April 2022, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU or Court) delivered its much awaited judgement in Case C-401/19 – Poland v Parliament and Council. The case focuses on the validity of Article 17 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive (CDSMD) in light of fundamental rights. The judgment marks the climax of a turbulent journey in the area of copyright law, with potential implications for the future of platform regulation and content moderation in EU law.
Quintais, J.
Article 17 survives, but freedom of expression safeguards are key: C-401/19 – Poland v Parliament and Council Tijdschriftartikel
In: Kluwer Copyright Blog, 2022.
@article{nokey,
title = {Article 17 survives, but freedom of expression safeguards are key: C-401/19 \textendash Poland v Parliament and Council},
author = {Quintais, J.},
url = {http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2022/04/26/article-17-survives-but-freedom-of-expression-safeguards-are-key-c-401-19-poland-v-parliament-and-council/},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-05-02},
urldate = {2022-05-02},
journal = {Kluwer Copyright Blog},
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pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Alberdingk Thijm, Chr. A.
Knock Knock Who's There? Tussenpersonen, persoonsgegevens en de kunst van het juiste evenwicht Tijdschriftartikel
In: Ars Aequi, ed. april, pp. 279-288, 2022.
@article{nokey,
title = {Knock Knock Who's There? Tussenpersonen, persoonsgegevens en de kunst van het juiste evenwicht},
author = {Alberdingk Thijm, Chr. A.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/nl/aa_2022/},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-04-08},
journal = {Ars Aequi},
issue = {april},
pages = {279-288},
abstract = {Wat te doen als je op Twitter door een anoniem profiel voor rotte vis wordt uitgemaakt? Het Nederlandse recht biedt verschillende mogelijkheden om identificerende gegevens te verkrijgen van internettussenpersonen. Maar hoe wordt de afweging met de bescherming van de persoonsgegevens van de anonymus gemaakt? Hoe verhoudt het recht op een doeltreffende voorziening in rechte zich tot het gegevensbeschermingsrecht? Het Hof van Justitie schrijft voor dat bij botsende
fundamentele rechten het ‘juiste evenwicht’ moet worden gevonden. Dat blijkt de Nederlandse rechter nog niet zo eenvoudig te vinden, zo wordt duidelijk bij de bespreking van het Dutch FilmWorks-arrest in dit artikel.},
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Wat te doen als je op Twitter door een anoniem profiel voor rotte vis wordt uitgemaakt? Het Nederlandse recht biedt verschillende mogelijkheden om identificerende gegevens te verkrijgen van internettussenpersonen. Maar hoe wordt de afweging met de bescherming van de persoonsgegevens van de anonymus gemaakt? Hoe verhoudt het recht op een doeltreffende voorziening in rechte zich tot het gegevensbeschermingsrecht? Het Hof van Justitie schrijft voor dat bij botsende
fundamentele rechten het ‘juiste evenwicht’ moet worden gevonden. Dat blijkt de Nederlandse rechter nog niet zo eenvoudig te vinden, zo wordt duidelijk bij de bespreking van het Dutch FilmWorks-arrest in dit artikel.
fundamentele rechten het ‘juiste evenwicht’ moet worden gevonden. Dat blijkt de Nederlandse rechter nog niet zo eenvoudig te vinden, zo wordt duidelijk bij de bespreking van het Dutch FilmWorks-arrest in dit artikel.
Hins, A.
Grondrechten voor de vijand Tijdschriftartikel
In: De Hofvijver, vol. 12, ed. 129, 2022.
@article{nokey,
title = {Grondrechten voor de vijand},
author = {Hins, A.},
url = {https://www.montesquieu-instituut.nl/id/vlrjjfj3ptw8/nieuws/grondrechthttps://www.ivir.nl/hofvijver-28-maart-2022-opinie-grondrechten-voor-de-vijand/},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-03-28},
journal = {De Hofvijver},
volume = {12},
issue = {129},
abstract = {Op 1 maart 2022 besloot de Raad van de Europese Unie tot een algemeen verbod op het doorgeven van de Russische propagandazenders RT (Russia Today) en Sputnik. In deze opinie wordt het standpunt ingenomen dat desinformatie moet worden bestreden, maar dat het middel van censuur erger is dan de kwaal.},
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Op 1 maart 2022 besloot de Raad van de Europese Unie tot een algemeen verbod op het doorgeven van de Russische propagandazenders RT (Russia Today) en Sputnik. In deze opinie wordt het standpunt ingenomen dat desinformatie moet worden bestreden, maar dat het middel van censuur erger is dan de kwaal.
van Eechoud, M.; Schumacher, L.D.
Data na de dood: Zwevend tussen contract en gegevensbescherming Tijdschriftartikel
In: Nederlands Juristenblad (NJB), ed. 6, nr. 355, pp. 396-405, 2022.
@article{nokey,
title = {Data na de dood: Zwevend tussen contract en gegevensbescherming},
author = {van Eechoud, M. and Schumacher, L.D.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/NJB_2022_355.pdf},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-02-14},
journal = {Nederlands Juristenblad (NJB)},
number = {355},
issue = {6},
pages = {396-405},
abstract = {Mensen zijn zich nog weinig bewust van wat de implicaties van overlijden zijn voor het digitale bezit dat ze nalaten, terwijl iedereen hier steeds meer van heeft. Opvattingen verschillen over de mate waarin erfgenamen toegang moeten krijgen; er is nog weinig bekend over (veranderende) maatschappelijke opvattingen daarover. Omdat digitale communicatie geregeerd wordt door standaardovereenkomsten met aanbieders van informatiediensten, wordt ook de positie van erfgenamen daar primair door bepaald. Tegelijkertijd hebben veel aanbieders nog geen doordacht ‘overlijdensbeleid’ en daarbij passende voorwaarden en tools. Het lijkt tijd dat de (Europese) wetgever daar wat aan gaat veranderen. Om op kortere termijn te zorgen voor meer rechtszekerheid, zou de Nederlandse wetgever in ieder geval enkele specifieke plichten en rechten uit de AVG van toepassing kunnen verklaren op de persoonsgegevens van overleden gebruikers van informatiediensten.},
keywords = {},
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}
Mensen zijn zich nog weinig bewust van wat de implicaties van overlijden zijn voor het digitale bezit dat ze nalaten, terwijl iedereen hier steeds meer van heeft. Opvattingen verschillen over de mate waarin erfgenamen toegang moeten krijgen; er is nog weinig bekend over (veranderende) maatschappelijke opvattingen daarover. Omdat digitale communicatie geregeerd wordt door standaardovereenkomsten met aanbieders van informatiediensten, wordt ook de positie van erfgenamen daar primair door bepaald. Tegelijkertijd hebben veel aanbieders nog geen doordacht ‘overlijdensbeleid’ en daarbij passende voorwaarden en tools. Het lijkt tijd dat de (Europese) wetgever daar wat aan gaat veranderen. Om op kortere termijn te zorgen voor meer rechtszekerheid, zou de Nederlandse wetgever in ieder geval enkele specifieke plichten en rechten uit de AVG van toepassing kunnen verklaren op de persoonsgegevens van overleden gebruikers van informatiediensten.
Fahy, R.; Dobber, T.; Zuiderveen Borgesius, F.; Shires, J.
Microtargeted propaganda by foreign actors: An interdisciplinary exploration Tijdschriftartikel
In: Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, pp. 856-877, 2022, (MJ, vol. 28, nr. 6, 2021).
@article{nokey,
title = {Microtargeted propaganda by foreign actors: An interdisciplinary exploration},
author = {Fahy, R. and Dobber, T. and Zuiderveen Borgesius, F. and Shires, J.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/MaastrichtJournalofEuropeanandComparativeLaw_2021_6.pdf},
doi = {10.1177/1023263X211042471},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-01-25},
urldate = {2021-12-31},
journal = {Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law},
pages = {856-877},
abstract = {This article discusses a problem that has received scant attention in literature: microtargeted propaganda by foreign actors. Microtargeting involves collecting information about people, and using that information to show them targeted political advertisements. Such microtargeting enables advertisers to target ads to specific groups of people, for instance people who visit certain websites, forums, or Facebook groups. This article focuses on one type of microtargeting: microtargeting by foreign actors. For example, Russia has targeted certain groups in the US with ads, aiming to sow discord. Foreign actors could also try to influence European elections, for instance by advertising in favour of a certain political party. Foreign propaganda possibilities existed before microtargeting. This article explores two questions. In what ways, if any, is microtargeted propaganda by foreign actors different from other foreign propaganda? What could lawmakers in Europe do to mitigate the risks of microtargeted propaganda?},
note = {MJ, vol. 28, nr. 6, 2021},
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pubstate = {published},
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This article discusses a problem that has received scant attention in literature: microtargeted propaganda by foreign actors. Microtargeting involves collecting information about people, and using that information to show them targeted political advertisements. Such microtargeting enables advertisers to target ads to specific groups of people, for instance people who visit certain websites, forums, or Facebook groups. This article focuses on one type of microtargeting: microtargeting by foreign actors. For example, Russia has targeted certain groups in the US with ads, aiming to sow discord. Foreign actors could also try to influence European elections, for instance by advertising in favour of a certain political party. Foreign propaganda possibilities existed before microtargeting. This article explores two questions. In what ways, if any, is microtargeted propaganda by foreign actors different from other foreign propaganda? What could lawmakers in Europe do to mitigate the risks of microtargeted propaganda?
Appelman, N.; Fahy, R.; van Hoboken, J.
Social Welfare, Risk Profiling and Fundamental Rights: The Case of SyRI in the Netherlands Tijdschriftartikel
In: JIPITEC, vol. 12, nr. 4, pp. 257-271, 2021.
@article{nokey,
title = {Social Welfare, Risk Profiling and Fundamental Rights: The Case of SyRI in the Netherlands},
author = {Appelman, N. and Fahy, R. and van Hoboken, J.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/jipitec_2021_4.pdf
https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-12-4-2021/5407},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-12-16},
journal = {JIPITEC},
volume = {12},
number = {4},
pages = {257-271},
abstract = {This article discusses the use of automated decisioning-making (ADM) systems by public administrative bodies, particularly systems designed to combat social-welfare fraud, from a European fundamental rights law perspective. The article begins by outlining the emerging fundamental rights issues in relation to ADM systems used by public administrative bodies. Building upon this, the article critically analyses a recent landmark judgment from the Netherlands and uses this as a case study for discussion of the application of fundamental rights law to ADM systems by public authorities more generally. In the so-called SyRI judgment, the District Court of The Hague held that a controversial automated welfare-fraud detection system (SyRI), which allows the linking and analysing of data from an array of government agencies to generate fraud-risk reports on people, violated the right to private life, guaranteed under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Court held that SyRI was insufficiently transparent, and contained insufficient safeguards, to protect the right to privacy, in violation of Article 8 ECHR. This was one of the first times an ADM system being used by welfare authorities has been halted on the basis of Article 8 ECHR. The article critically analyses the SyRI judgment from a fundamental rights perspective, including by examining how the Court brought principles contained in the General Data Protection Regulation within the rubric of Article 8 ECHR as well as the importance the Court attaches to the principle of transparency under Article 8 ECHR. Finally, the article discusses how the Dutch government responded to the judgment. and discusses proposed new legislation, which is arguably more invasive, with the article concluding with some lessons that can be drawn for the broader policy and legal debate on ADM systems used by public authorities. implications.},
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}
This article discusses the use of automated decisioning-making (ADM) systems by public administrative bodies, particularly systems designed to combat social-welfare fraud, from a European fundamental rights law perspective. The article begins by outlining the emerging fundamental rights issues in relation to ADM systems used by public administrative bodies. Building upon this, the article critically analyses a recent landmark judgment from the Netherlands and uses this as a case study for discussion of the application of fundamental rights law to ADM systems by public authorities more generally. In the so-called SyRI judgment, the District Court of The Hague held that a controversial automated welfare-fraud detection system (SyRI), which allows the linking and analysing of data from an array of government agencies to generate fraud-risk reports on people, violated the right to private life, guaranteed under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Court held that SyRI was insufficiently transparent, and contained insufficient safeguards, to protect the right to privacy, in violation of Article 8 ECHR. This was one of the first times an ADM system being used by welfare authorities has been halted on the basis of Article 8 ECHR. The article critically analyses the SyRI judgment from a fundamental rights perspective, including by examining how the Court brought principles contained in the General Data Protection Regulation within the rubric of Article 8 ECHR as well as the importance the Court attaches to the principle of transparency under Article 8 ECHR. Finally, the article discusses how the Dutch government responded to the judgment. and discusses proposed new legislation, which is arguably more invasive, with the article concluding with some lessons that can be drawn for the broader policy and legal debate on ADM systems used by public authorities. implications.
Dommering, E.
Annotatie bij EHRM 25 mei 2021 (Big Brother Watch e.a. / Verenigd Koninkrijk) en Hof van Justitie EU 6 oktober 2020 (La Quadrature du Net e.a. / Premier ministre e.a.) Tijdschriftartikel
In: Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, nr. 49, pp. 6225-6237, 2021.
@article{nokey,
title = {Annotatie bij EHRM 25 mei 2021 (Big Brother Watch e.a. / Verenigd Koninkrijk) en Hof van Justitie EU 6 oktober 2020 (La Quadrature du Net e.a. / Premier ministre e.a.)},
author = {Dommering, E.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Annotatie_NJ_2021_362.pdf},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-12-07},
journal = {Nederlandse Jurisprudentie},
number = {49},
pages = {6225-6237},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Hins, A.
Annotatie bij Rb. Noord-Holland 6 oktober 2021 (Van Haga / LinkedIn) Tijdschriftartikel
In: Mediaforum, vol. 33, nr. 6, pp. 206-208, 2021.
@article{nokey,
title = {Annotatie bij Rb. Noord-Holland 6 oktober 2021 (Van Haga / LinkedIn)},
author = {Hins, A.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Annotatie_Mf_2021_6.pdf},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-12-02},
journal = {Mediaforum},
volume = {33},
number = {6},
pages = {206-208},
abstract = {Het Tweede Kamerlid Van Haga heeft op zijn LinkedIn profielpagina berichten geplaatst waarin hij de gevaren van het coronavirus in twijfel trok. Het bedrijf LinkedIn heeft eerst een paar van deze berichten verwijderd en daarna het account van Van Haga helemaal be\"{e}indigd. In het kort geding ging het onder meer om de vraag in hoeverre Van Haga beschermd wordt door de vrijheid van meningsuiting.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
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}
Het Tweede Kamerlid Van Haga heeft op zijn LinkedIn profielpagina berichten geplaatst waarin hij de gevaren van het coronavirus in twijfel trok. Het bedrijf LinkedIn heeft eerst een paar van deze berichten verwijderd en daarna het account van Van Haga helemaal beëindigd. In het kort geding ging het onder meer om de vraag in hoeverre Van Haga beschermd wordt door de vrijheid van meningsuiting.
Senftleben, M.; van Gompel, S.; Helmond, A.; Schumacher, L.D.; Ausloos, J.; van Hoboken, J.; Quintais, J.
Webharvesting Technisch verslag
2021, (Onderzoek in opdracht van het Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum (WODC), 20 september 2021, WODC rapport 3142.).
@techreport{nokey,
title = {Webharvesting},
author = {Senftleben, M. and van Gompel, S. and Helmond, A. and Schumacher, L.D. and Ausloos, J. and van Hoboken, J. and Quintais, J.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Webharvesting_WODC.pdf},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-11-25},
urldate = {2021-11-25},
abstract = {Aan het volgende onderzoeksrapport ligt de doelstelling ten grondslag om te inventariseren wat juridisch, beleidsmatig en technisch nodig is om webharvesting mogelijk te maken, onder meer in de vorm van een zogenaamde nationale “domeincrawl”: het systematische kopi\"{e}ren en archiveren van webpagina’s die een afspiegeling vormen van de Nederlandse sociale, culturele, economische, juridische, politieke en wetenschappelijke geschiedenis online.},
note = {Onderzoek in opdracht van het Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum (WODC), 20 september 2021, WODC rapport 3142.},
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Aan het volgende onderzoeksrapport ligt de doelstelling ten grondslag om te inventariseren wat juridisch, beleidsmatig en technisch nodig is om webharvesting mogelijk te maken, onder meer in de vorm van een zogenaamde nationale “domeincrawl”: het systematische kopiëren en archiveren van webpagina’s die een afspiegeling vormen van de Nederlandse sociale, culturele, economische, juridische, politieke en wetenschappelijke geschiedenis online.
Dommering, E.
Het coronabeleid is onconstitutioneel Tijdschriftartikel
In: Nederlands Juristenblad (NJB), nr. 41, pp. 3396-3398, 2021.
@article{nokey,
title = {Het coronabeleid is onconstitutioneel},
author = {Dommering, E.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/NJB_Opinie_2021.pdf},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-11-25},
journal = {Nederlands Juristenblad (NJB)},
number = {41},
pages = {3396-3398},
abstract = {De Staat is verplicht om in te grijpen bij het uitbreken van een pandemie van een gevaarlijke ziekte en moet dan maatregelen treffen om deze zoveel mogelijk in te dammen. Maar daarbij hoort een ingewikkelde afweging van conflicterende fundamentele rechten, belangen en redelijkerwijze van de ingreep te verwachten gevolgen. Deze noodzakelijke grondrechtelijke toetsing was, is en blijft maar achterwege bij de coronamaat-regelen die in Nederland uitgevaardigd worden.},
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De Staat is verplicht om in te grijpen bij het uitbreken van een pandemie van een gevaarlijke ziekte en moet dan maatregelen treffen om deze zoveel mogelijk in te dammen. Maar daarbij hoort een ingewikkelde afweging van conflicterende fundamentele rechten, belangen en redelijkerwijze van de ingreep te verwachten gevolgen. Deze noodzakelijke grondrechtelijke toetsing was, is en blijft maar achterwege bij de coronamaat-regelen die in Nederland uitgevaardigd worden.
Fahy, R.; Helberger, N.; Appelman, N.
The perils of legally defining disinformation Tijdschriftartikel
In: Internet Policy Review, vol. 10, nr. 4, 2021.
@article{nokey,
title = {The perils of legally defining disinformation},
author = {Fahy, R. and Helberger, N. and Appelman, N.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/InternetPolicyReview_2021.pdf},
doi = {10.14763/2021.4.1584},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-11-12},
journal = {Internet Policy Review},
volume = {10},
number = {4},
abstract = {EU policy considers disinformation to be harmful content, rather than illegal content. However, EU member states have recently been making disinformation illegal. This article discusses the definitions that form the basis of EU disinformation policy, and analyses national legislation in EU member states applicable to the definitions of disinformation, in light of freedom of expression and the proposed Digital Services Act. The article discusses the perils of defining disinformation in EU legislation, and including provisions on online platforms being required to remove illegal content, which may end up being applicable to overbroad national laws criminalising false news and false information.},
keywords = {},
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}
EU policy considers disinformation to be harmful content, rather than illegal content. However, EU member states have recently been making disinformation illegal. This article discusses the definitions that form the basis of EU disinformation policy, and analyses national legislation in EU member states applicable to the definitions of disinformation, in light of freedom of expression and the proposed Digital Services Act. The article discusses the perils of defining disinformation in EU legislation, and including provisions on online platforms being required to remove illegal content, which may end up being applicable to overbroad national laws criminalising false news and false information.
Irion, K.; Es, R. van; Meeren, K. van der; Dijkman, D.
Evaluatie PNR Wet Technisch verslag
2021, (WODC Rapport 3181, geschreven door K. Irion, R. van Es (IViR), K. van der Meeren & D. Dijkman (It's Public), november 2021).
@techreport{nokey,
title = {Evaluatie PNR Wet},
author = {Irion, K. and Es, R. van and Meeren, K. van der and Dijkman, D.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/evaluatie-pnr-wet-1.pdf
https://repository.wodc.nl/handle/20.500.12832/3118},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-11-11},
abstract = {Op 18 juni 2019 is de Wet gebruik van passagiersgegevens voor de bestrijding van terroristische en ernstige misdrijven (PNR-wet) in werking getreden. Deze wet verplicht de luchtvaartmaatschappijen om passagiersgegevens van elke vlucht die in Nederland vertrekt of aankomt te verstrekken aan de Passagiersinformatie-eenheid Nederland (Pi-NL). De Pi-NL mag krachtens deze wet verzamelde passagiersgegevens uitsluitend verwerken voor het voorkomen, opsporen, onderzoeken en vervolgen van terroristische misdrijven en ernstige criminaliteit. Met de aanname van de PNR-wet voldoet de Nederlandse wetgever aan zijn plicht om de EU-richtlijn 2016/681 (PNR-richtlijn) te implementeren. Dit onderzoek vervult de verplichting uit artikel 25 van de PNR-wet dat twee jaar na de inwerkingtreding van de wet een evaluatie dient plaats te vinden van de doeltreffendheid en de effecten van deze wet in de praktijk. Deze evaluatie is ook gericht op de naleving van de privacywaarborgen en op de verwerking van passagiersgegevens van intra-EU-vluchten. De periode waarop deze evaluatie betrekking heeft, loopt van de inwerkingtreding van de wet op 18 juni 2019 tot 5 juli 2021},
note = {WODC Rapport 3181, geschreven door K. Irion, R. van Es (IViR), K. van der Meeren \& D. Dijkman (It's Public), november 2021},
keywords = {},
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Op 18 juni 2019 is de Wet gebruik van passagiersgegevens voor de bestrijding van terroristische en ernstige misdrijven (PNR-wet) in werking getreden. Deze wet verplicht de luchtvaartmaatschappijen om passagiersgegevens van elke vlucht die in Nederland vertrekt of aankomt te verstrekken aan de Passagiersinformatie-eenheid Nederland (Pi-NL). De Pi-NL mag krachtens deze wet verzamelde passagiersgegevens uitsluitend verwerken voor het voorkomen, opsporen, onderzoeken en vervolgen van terroristische misdrijven en ernstige criminaliteit. Met de aanname van de PNR-wet voldoet de Nederlandse wetgever aan zijn plicht om de EU-richtlijn 2016/681 (PNR-richtlijn) te implementeren. Dit onderzoek vervult de verplichting uit artikel 25 van de PNR-wet dat twee jaar na de inwerkingtreding van de wet een evaluatie dient plaats te vinden van de doeltreffendheid en de effecten van deze wet in de praktijk. Deze evaluatie is ook gericht op de naleving van de privacywaarborgen en op de verwerking van passagiersgegevens van intra-EU-vluchten. De periode waarop deze evaluatie betrekking heeft, loopt van de inwerkingtreding van de wet op 18 juni 2019 tot 5 juli 2021
Janssen, H.
Persoonlijke PIMS: privacyfort of luchtkasteel? Tijdschriftartikel
In: Privacy & Informatie, nr. 5, pp. 214-225, 2021.
@article{Janssen2021c,
title = {Persoonlijke PIMS: privacyfort of luchtkasteel?},
author = {Janssen, H.},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-10-28},
journal = {Privacy \& Informatie},
number = {5},
pages = {214-225},
abstract = {Persoonsgegevens worden thans veelal op ondoorzichtige wijze, buiten de controle van de betrokkenen verwerkt. Persoonlijke informatiebeheersystemen (PIMS) willen betrokkenen technologische toepassingen aanreiken, die hun meer controle geven over de verwerking van hun persoonsgegevens. PIMS presenteren zich als alternatief voor de huidige, ‘gecentraliseerde’ wijze van gegevensverwerking, waarbij (grote) organisaties persoonsgegevens op meestal ondoorzichtige wijze verzamelen, analyseren en doorgeven aan derden. PIMS bieden betrokkenen technische instrumenten waarmee zij zelf kunnen controleren en bepalen wanneer en aan wie zijn hun gegevens overdragen, en/of analyses over hun gegevens kunnen laten uitvoeren. Hoewel argumenten voor deze ‘decentralisatie’
aantrekkelijk klinken, rijzen vragen over de mate waarin PIMS de problemen met de huidige gegevensverwerking effectief kunnen bestrijden. In dit artikel ligt de focus bij de vraag in hoeverre deze PIMS de machtsongelijkheid tussen betrokkenen en grote organisaties daadwerkelijk kunnen bestrijden, die als gevolg van de huidige gegevensverwerkingspraktijk zijn ontstaan. PIMS kunnen enig inzicht in en controle over gegevensverwerking bieden, maar desondanks zal de machtsongelijkheid grotendeels blijven voortbestaan.},
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}
Persoonsgegevens worden thans veelal op ondoorzichtige wijze, buiten de controle van de betrokkenen verwerkt. Persoonlijke informatiebeheersystemen (PIMS) willen betrokkenen technologische toepassingen aanreiken, die hun meer controle geven over de verwerking van hun persoonsgegevens. PIMS presenteren zich als alternatief voor de huidige, ‘gecentraliseerde’ wijze van gegevensverwerking, waarbij (grote) organisaties persoonsgegevens op meestal ondoorzichtige wijze verzamelen, analyseren en doorgeven aan derden. PIMS bieden betrokkenen technische instrumenten waarmee zij zelf kunnen controleren en bepalen wanneer en aan wie zijn hun gegevens overdragen, en/of analyses over hun gegevens kunnen laten uitvoeren. Hoewel argumenten voor deze ‘decentralisatie’
aantrekkelijk klinken, rijzen vragen over de mate waarin PIMS de problemen met de huidige gegevensverwerking effectief kunnen bestrijden. In dit artikel ligt de focus bij de vraag in hoeverre deze PIMS de machtsongelijkheid tussen betrokkenen en grote organisaties daadwerkelijk kunnen bestrijden, die als gevolg van de huidige gegevensverwerkingspraktijk zijn ontstaan. PIMS kunnen enig inzicht in en controle over gegevensverwerking bieden, maar desondanks zal de machtsongelijkheid grotendeels blijven voortbestaan.
aantrekkelijk klinken, rijzen vragen over de mate waarin PIMS de problemen met de huidige gegevensverwerking effectief kunnen bestrijden. In dit artikel ligt de focus bij de vraag in hoeverre deze PIMS de machtsongelijkheid tussen betrokkenen en grote organisaties daadwerkelijk kunnen bestrijden, die als gevolg van de huidige gegevensverwerkingspraktijk zijn ontstaan. PIMS kunnen enig inzicht in en controle over gegevensverwerking bieden, maar desondanks zal de machtsongelijkheid grotendeels blijven voortbestaan.
Giannopoulou, A.
Putting Data Protection by Design on the Blockchain Tijdschriftartikel
In: European Data Protection Law Review, vol. 7, nr. 3, pp. 388-399, 2021.
@article{Giannopoulou2021,
title = {Putting Data Protection by Design on the Blockchain},
author = {Giannopoulou, A.},
doi = {10.21552/edpl/2021/3/7},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-10-22},
urldate = {2021-10-22},
journal = {European Data Protection Law Review},
volume = {7},
number = {3},
pages = {388-399},
abstract = {The principle of data protection by design, as it is enshrined in article 25 of the GDPR, is difficult to apply in blockchains. This article will assess how the reliance on asymmetric encryption and other privacy enhancing technological architectures -necessary in a blockchain-based system- approach both user control and data protection by design compliance from the single scope of anonymization and unlinkability. Data subjects’ rights, accountability, and the potential shortcomings of applied technological constraints are thus sidelined. Ultimately, this limited understanding of technological privacy, acts as a misguiding set of principles for technological co-regulation through standardisation in blockchains. The standardization of these choices without a holistic analysis of data protection by design imperatives could ultimately weaken the position of data subjects, whose trust in the technological protections of personal data might prove to be relatively misplaced.},
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}
The principle of data protection by design, as it is enshrined in article 25 of the GDPR, is difficult to apply in blockchains. This article will assess how the reliance on asymmetric encryption and other privacy enhancing technological architectures -necessary in a blockchain-based system- approach both user control and data protection by design compliance from the single scope of anonymization and unlinkability. Data subjects’ rights, accountability, and the potential shortcomings of applied technological constraints are thus sidelined. Ultimately, this limited understanding of technological privacy, acts as a misguiding set of principles for technological co-regulation through standardisation in blockchains. The standardization of these choices without a holistic analysis of data protection by design imperatives could ultimately weaken the position of data subjects, whose trust in the technological protections of personal data might prove to be relatively misplaced.
Appelman, N.; Quintais, J.; Fahy, R.
Verfassungsblog, (Ed.): Verfassungsblog 2021.
@online{Appelman2021,
title = {Using Terms and Conditions to apply Fundamental Rights to Content Moderation: Is Article 12 DSA a Paper Tiger?},
author = {Appelman, N. and Quintais, J. and Fahy, R.},
editor = {Verfassungsblog},
url = {https://verfassungsblog.de/power-dsa-dma-06/},
doi = {10.17176/20210901-233103-0.},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-09-01},
organization = {Verfassungsblog},
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pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {online}
}
Helberger, N.; Dobber, T.; Vreese, C.H. de
Towards Unfair Political Practices Law: Learning lessons from the regulation of unfair commercial practices for online political advertising Tijdschriftartikel
In: JIPITEC, vol. 12, nr. 3, pp. 273-296, 2021.
@article{Helberger2021bb,
title = {Towards Unfair Political Practices Law: Learning lessons from the regulation of unfair commercial practices for online political advertising},
author = {Helberger, N. and Dobber, T. and Vreese, C.H. de},
url = {https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-12-3-2021/5338},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-08-26},
journal = {JIPITEC},
volume = {12},
number = {3},
pages = {273-296},
abstract = {Online political advertising operates in a tense forcefield between political and commercial elements and thus presents regulators with a difficult conundrum: because online political advertising is political rather than commercial speech, it is destined to follow a different regulatory tradition than commercial advertising. And yet many of the tools used, players involved and concerns triggered by modern online political advertising strategies very much resemble the tools, players and concerns in online commercial targeting. Commercial advertising is subject to consumer law and unfair advertising regulation, including rules about unfair commercial practices. Unfair commercial practices law and other rules about commercial advertising, however, are explicitly not applicable to forms of non-commercial political or ideological advertising. An important reason why this is so is the different level of protection of political and commercial speech under fundamental rights law standards. And yet with the ongoing commercial turn in advertising, the traditional division between forms of commercial and political advertising is no longer that self-evident. Also, it cannot be denied that commercial advertising law has a long tradition of thinking of where and how to draw the line between lawful advertising and unlawful persuasion through withholding or misleading consumers about the information they need to take informed decisions, or abusing superior knowledge, exerting undue psychological pressure and engaging in other forms of unfair behaviour. The question this article explores is whether there are lessons to be learned from the regulation of commercial advertising for the pending initiatives at the national and the European level to regulate online political advertising, and online political targeting in specific.},
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Online political advertising operates in a tense forcefield between political and commercial elements and thus presents regulators with a difficult conundrum: because online political advertising is political rather than commercial speech, it is destined to follow a different regulatory tradition than commercial advertising. And yet many of the tools used, players involved and concerns triggered by modern online political advertising strategies very much resemble the tools, players and concerns in online commercial targeting. Commercial advertising is subject to consumer law and unfair advertising regulation, including rules about unfair commercial practices. Unfair commercial practices law and other rules about commercial advertising, however, are explicitly not applicable to forms of non-commercial political or ideological advertising. An important reason why this is so is the different level of protection of political and commercial speech under fundamental rights law standards. And yet with the ongoing commercial turn in advertising, the traditional division between forms of commercial and political advertising is no longer that self-evident. Also, it cannot be denied that commercial advertising law has a long tradition of thinking of where and how to draw the line between lawful advertising and unlawful persuasion through withholding or misleading consumers about the information they need to take informed decisions, or abusing superior knowledge, exerting undue psychological pressure and engaging in other forms of unfair behaviour. The question this article explores is whether there are lessons to be learned from the regulation of commercial advertising for the pending initiatives at the national and the European level to regulate online political advertising, and online political targeting in specific.
van Eechoud, M.; Ausloos, J.; Loos, M.; Mak, C.; Reinhartz, B.; Schumacher, L.D.; Pol, L.
Data na de dood - juridische aspecten van digitale nalatenschappen Technisch verslag
2021, (Onderzoek in opdracht van het Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, April 2021, Bijlage bij Kamerstuk 2020-2021, 30696 nr. 52.
Auteurs: M.M.M. van Eechoud, J. Ausloos, M. Loos, C. Mak, B. Reinhartz, L. Schumacher & L. Pol.).
@techreport{vanEechoud2021bb,
title = {Data na de dood - juridische aspecten van digitale nalatenschappen},
author = {van Eechoud, M. and Ausloos, J. and Loos, M. and Mak, C. and Reinhartz, B. and Schumacher, L.D. and Pol, L. },
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Data-na-de-dood.pdf
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Datanadedood_summary.pdf
https://www.sectorplandls.nl/wordpress/news/data-after-death-legal-aspects-of-digital-inheritances/},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-07-08},
urldate = {2021-07-08},
abstract = {Jaarlijks overlijden ruim 150.000 mensen en worden er dus ook ongeveer evenveel nalatenschappen afgewikkeld. Vrijwel zonder uitzondering laten overledenen digitale ‘bezittingen’ achter, zoals sociale media-accounts, e-mails, documenten opgeslagen in de cloud en (gebruiksrechten op) allerlei media en entertainment. De vraag is of het huidige Nederlandse wettelijk kader voldoende handvatten biedt om de bij afwikkeling van digitale nalatenschappen gemoeide private en publieke belangen te behartigen. De centrale onderzoeksvraag van deze studie is: Welke eventuele aanpassingen van het Nederlandse wettelijke kader zijn wenselijk met het oog op de adequate bescherming van private en publieke belangen gemoeid met het regelen en afwikkelen van digitale nalatenschappen?
Voor de beantwoording van deze vraag is om te beginnen een analyse gedaan van het beleid van aanbieders van veelgebruikte informatiediensten rond overlijden, en van de relevante voorwaarden die zij hanteren. Bronnen voor de analyse zijn gebruikersovereenkomsten, algemene voorwaarden, privacy policies en andere (openbare) documenten zoals FAQ’s. Informatiediensten aanbieders zijn onderscheiden in digitale mediadiensten (commercieel aanbod zoals streaming video of -muziek), communicatiediensten (waaronder sociale media en berichtendiensten) en ICT-diensten (o.a. cloudopslag en digitale kluizen). Vervolgens is het relevante wettelijke kader beschreven en zijn onduidelijkheden daarin ge\"{i}dentificeerd. Naast het erfrecht, betreft dit het overeenkomstenrecht en dan in het bijzonder consumentenrecht, intellectuele eigendomsrechten (met name auteursrecht), persoonlijkheidsrechten en gegevensbeschermingsrecht (Algemene Verordening Gegevensbescherming). Ook het algemene vermogensrecht is van belang, voor zover betrekking hebbend op de vraag welk digitaal ‘bezit’ in de nalatenschap valt. Tot slot is met het oog op het formuleren van oplossingsrichtingen, naar een selectie van wetgeving in andere landen gekeken.},
note = {Onderzoek in opdracht van het Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, April 2021, Bijlage bij Kamerstuk 2020-2021, 30696 nr. 52.
Auteurs: M.M.M. van Eechoud, J. Ausloos, M. Loos, C. Mak, B. Reinhartz, L. Schumacher \& L. Pol.},
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Jaarlijks overlijden ruim 150.000 mensen en worden er dus ook ongeveer evenveel nalatenschappen afgewikkeld. Vrijwel zonder uitzondering laten overledenen digitale ‘bezittingen’ achter, zoals sociale media-accounts, e-mails, documenten opgeslagen in de cloud en (gebruiksrechten op) allerlei media en entertainment. De vraag is of het huidige Nederlandse wettelijk kader voldoende handvatten biedt om de bij afwikkeling van digitale nalatenschappen gemoeide private en publieke belangen te behartigen. De centrale onderzoeksvraag van deze studie is: Welke eventuele aanpassingen van het Nederlandse wettelijke kader zijn wenselijk met het oog op de adequate bescherming van private en publieke belangen gemoeid met het regelen en afwikkelen van digitale nalatenschappen?
Voor de beantwoording van deze vraag is om te beginnen een analyse gedaan van het beleid van aanbieders van veelgebruikte informatiediensten rond overlijden, en van de relevante voorwaarden die zij hanteren. Bronnen voor de analyse zijn gebruikersovereenkomsten, algemene voorwaarden, privacy policies en andere (openbare) documenten zoals FAQ’s. Informatiediensten aanbieders zijn onderscheiden in digitale mediadiensten (commercieel aanbod zoals streaming video of -muziek), communicatiediensten (waaronder sociale media en berichtendiensten) en ICT-diensten (o.a. cloudopslag en digitale kluizen). Vervolgens is het relevante wettelijke kader beschreven en zijn onduidelijkheden daarin geïdentificeerd. Naast het erfrecht, betreft dit het overeenkomstenrecht en dan in het bijzonder consumentenrecht, intellectuele eigendomsrechten (met name auteursrecht), persoonlijkheidsrechten en gegevensbeschermingsrecht (Algemene Verordening Gegevensbescherming). Ook het algemene vermogensrecht is van belang, voor zover betrekking hebbend op de vraag welk digitaal ‘bezit’ in de nalatenschap valt. Tot slot is met het oog op het formuleren van oplossingsrichtingen, naar een selectie van wetgeving in andere landen gekeken.
Voor de beantwoording van deze vraag is om te beginnen een analyse gedaan van het beleid van aanbieders van veelgebruikte informatiediensten rond overlijden, en van de relevante voorwaarden die zij hanteren. Bronnen voor de analyse zijn gebruikersovereenkomsten, algemene voorwaarden, privacy policies en andere (openbare) documenten zoals FAQ’s. Informatiediensten aanbieders zijn onderscheiden in digitale mediadiensten (commercieel aanbod zoals streaming video of -muziek), communicatiediensten (waaronder sociale media en berichtendiensten) en ICT-diensten (o.a. cloudopslag en digitale kluizen). Vervolgens is het relevante wettelijke kader beschreven en zijn onduidelijkheden daarin geïdentificeerd. Naast het erfrecht, betreft dit het overeenkomstenrecht en dan in het bijzonder consumentenrecht, intellectuele eigendomsrechten (met name auteursrecht), persoonlijkheidsrechten en gegevensbeschermingsrecht (Algemene Verordening Gegevensbescherming). Ook het algemene vermogensrecht is van belang, voor zover betrekking hebbend op de vraag welk digitaal ‘bezit’ in de nalatenschap valt. Tot slot is met het oog op het formuleren van oplossingsrichtingen, naar een selectie van wetgeving in andere landen gekeken.
Sax, M.
Voorbij privacy: manipulatie is het échte probleem in gezondheidsapps Tijdschriftartikel
In: Privacy & Informatie, nr. 3, pp. 117-120, 2021.
@article{Sax2021b,
title = {Voorbij privacy: manipulatie is het \'{e}chte probleem in gezondheidsapps},
author = {Sax, M.},
url = {https://www.uitgeverijparis.nl/nl/reader/209785/1001582341},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-06-24},
journal = {Privacy \& Informatie},
number = {3},
pages = {117-120},
abstract = {Ze zijn enorm populair en zullen alleen nog maar populairder worden: gezondheidsapps. Er zijn populaire gezondheidsapps met tientallen tot soms honderden miljoenen gebruikers voor van alles en nog wat: dieetadviezen en calorie\"{e}ntellen (MyFitnessPal), meditatie en mindfulness (Headspace), het tracken en onderling vergelijken van sportactiviteiten (Strava), het tracken van je algehele bewegings- en gezondheidspatronen via een wearable (Fitbit), enzovoort. Hun huidige populariteit zal alleen nog maar toenemen, aangezien werkgevers en verzekeraars steeds nadrukkelijker het gebruik van gezondheidsapps aanprijzen. 1 Gezondheid is goed, meer gezondheid is beter. Geweldig toch, die alsmaar toenemende populariteit van gezondheidsapps?},
keywords = {},
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Ze zijn enorm populair en zullen alleen nog maar populairder worden: gezondheidsapps. Er zijn populaire gezondheidsapps met tientallen tot soms honderden miljoenen gebruikers voor van alles en nog wat: dieetadviezen en calorieëntellen (MyFitnessPal), meditatie en mindfulness (Headspace), het tracken en onderling vergelijken van sportactiviteiten (Strava), het tracken van je algehele bewegings- en gezondheidspatronen via een wearable (Fitbit), enzovoort. Hun huidige populariteit zal alleen nog maar toenemen, aangezien werkgevers en verzekeraars steeds nadrukkelijker het gebruik van gezondheidsapps aanprijzen. 1 Gezondheid is goed, meer gezondheid is beter. Geweldig toch, die alsmaar toenemende populariteit van gezondheidsapps?
van Hoboken, J.; Fahy, R.
Smartphone platforms as privacy regulators Tijdschriftartikel
In: Computer Law & Security Review, vol. 41, 2021.
@article{vanHoboken2021b,
title = {Smartphone platforms as privacy regulators},
author = {van Hoboken, J. and Fahy, R.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Smartphone-platforms-as-privacy-regulators.pdf},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2021.105557},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-06-10},
journal = {Computer Law \& Security Review},
volume = {41},
abstract = {A series of recent developments highlight the increasingly important role of online platforms in impacting data privacy in today's digital economy. Revelations and parliamentary hearings about privacy violations in Facebook's app and service partner ecosystem, EU Court of Justice judgments on joint responsibility of platforms and platform users, and the rise of smartphone app ecosystems where app behaviour is governed by app distribution platforms and operating systems, all show that platform policies can make or break the enjoyment of privacy by users. In this article, we examine these developments and explore the question of what can and should be the role of platforms in protecting data privacy of their users.},
keywords = {},
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}
A series of recent developments highlight the increasingly important role of online platforms in impacting data privacy in today's digital economy. Revelations and parliamentary hearings about privacy violations in Facebook's app and service partner ecosystem, EU Court of Justice judgments on joint responsibility of platforms and platform users, and the rise of smartphone app ecosystems where app behaviour is governed by app distribution platforms and operating systems, all show that platform policies can make or break the enjoyment of privacy by users. In this article, we examine these developments and explore the question of what can and should be the role of platforms in protecting data privacy of their users.
van Hoboken, J.; Fahy, R.
Regulating Disinformation in Europe: Implications for Speech and Privacy Tijdschriftartikel
In: UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law, vol. 6, nr. 1, pp. 9-36, 2021.
@article{vanHoboken2021,
title = {Regulating Disinformation in Europe: Implications for Speech and Privacy},
author = {van Hoboken, J. and Fahy, R.},
url = {https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/Regulating-Disinformation-in-Europe.pdf},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-06-01},
journal = {UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law},
volume = {6},
number = {1},
pages = {9-36},
abstract = {This Article examines the ongoing dynamics in the regulation of disinformation in Europe, focusing on the intersection between the right to
freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Importantly, there has been a recent wave of regulatory measures and other forms of pressure on online platforms to tackle disinformation in Europe. These measures play out in different ways at the intersection of the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Crucially, as governments, journalists, and researchers seek greater transparency and access to information from online platforms to evaluate their impact on the health of their democracies, these measures raise acute issues related to user privacy. Indeed, platforms that once refused to cooperate with governments in identifying users allegedly responsible for disseminating illegal or harmful content are now expanding cooperation. However, while platforms are increasingly facilitating government access to user data, platforms are also invoking data protection law concerns as a shield in response to recent efforts at increased platform transparency. At
the same time, data protection law provides for one of the main systemic regulatory safeguards in Europe. It protects user autonomy concerning datadriven campaigns, requiring transparency for internet audiences about targeting and data subject rights in relation to audience platforms, such as social media companies.},
keywords = {},
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This Article examines the ongoing dynamics in the regulation of disinformation in Europe, focusing on the intersection between the right to
freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Importantly, there has been a recent wave of regulatory measures and other forms of pressure on online platforms to tackle disinformation in Europe. These measures play out in different ways at the intersection of the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Crucially, as governments, journalists, and researchers seek greater transparency and access to information from online platforms to evaluate their impact on the health of their democracies, these measures raise acute issues related to user privacy. Indeed, platforms that once refused to cooperate with governments in identifying users allegedly responsible for disseminating illegal or harmful content are now expanding cooperation. However, while platforms are increasingly facilitating government access to user data, platforms are also invoking data protection law concerns as a shield in response to recent efforts at increased platform transparency. At
the same time, data protection law provides for one of the main systemic regulatory safeguards in Europe. It protects user autonomy concerning datadriven campaigns, requiring transparency for internet audiences about targeting and data subject rights in relation to audience platforms, such as social media companies.
freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Importantly, there has been a recent wave of regulatory measures and other forms of pressure on online platforms to tackle disinformation in Europe. These measures play out in different ways at the intersection of the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Crucially, as governments, journalists, and researchers seek greater transparency and access to information from online platforms to evaluate their impact on the health of their democracies, these measures raise acute issues related to user privacy. Indeed, platforms that once refused to cooperate with governments in identifying users allegedly responsible for disseminating illegal or harmful content are now expanding cooperation. However, while platforms are increasingly facilitating government access to user data, platforms are also invoking data protection law concerns as a shield in response to recent efforts at increased platform transparency. At
the same time, data protection law provides for one of the main systemic regulatory safeguards in Europe. It protects user autonomy concerning datadriven campaigns, requiring transparency for internet audiences about targeting and data subject rights in relation to audience platforms, such as social media companies.
Quintais, J.; Appelman, N.; Fahy, R.
DSA Observatory 2021.
@online{Quintais2021f,
title = {Article 12 DSA: Will platforms be required to apply EU fundamental rights in content moderation decisions? },
author = {Quintais, J. and Appelman, N. and Fahy, R.},
url = {https://dsa-observatory.eu/2021/05/31/article-12-dsa-will-platforms-be-required-to-apply-eu-fundamental-rights-in-content-moderation-decisions/},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-05-31},
organization = {DSA Observatory},
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Voorhoof, D.; McGonagle, T.
Freedom of expression, the Media and Journalists: Case-law of the Euopean Court of Human Rights Tijdschriftartikel
In: 2021, ISBN: 9789287184351, (IRIS Themes, vol. III, 6th edition, April 2021).
@article{Voorhoof2021,
title = {Freedom of expression, the Media and Journalists: Case-law of the Euopean Court of Human Rights},
author = {Voorhoof, D. and McGonagle, T.},
url = {https://rm.coe.int/iris-themes-vol-iii-2020-edition-en-28-april-2021-/1680a24eee},
isbn = {9789287184351},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-05-06},
abstract = {This e-book provides valuable insights into the European Court of Human Rights’ extensive case-law on freedom of expression and media and journalistic freedoms. The first four editions of the e-book (2013, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2020) have proved hugely successful. The new sixth edition summarises over 339 judgments or decisions by the Court and provides hyperlinks to the full text of each of the summarised judgments or decisions (via HUDOC, the Court's online case-law database). },
note = {IRIS Themes, vol. III, 6th edition, April 2021},
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This e-book provides valuable insights into the European Court of Human Rights’ extensive case-law on freedom of expression and media and journalistic freedoms. The first four editions of the e-book (2013, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2020) have proved hugely successful. The new sixth edition summarises over 339 judgments or decisions by the Court and provides hyperlinks to the full text of each of the summarised judgments or decisions (via HUDOC, the Court's online case-law database).
Irion, K.
Formal meeting (oral evidence session): Digital trade and data Online
2021.
@online{Irion2021b,
title = {Formal meeting (oral evidence session): Digital trade and data},
author = {Irion, K.},
url = {https://committees.parliament.uk/event/3859/formal-meeting-oral-evidence-session/},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-03-12},
abstract = {Oral testimony on the UK House of Commons International Trade Committee. The Committee has launched an inquiry into digital trade and data. Digital trade refers to digitally enabled, or digitally delivered, trade in goods and services. Such trade involves the movement of data.
The Committee’s inquiry will explore a range of issues, including:
• Digital trade and data provisions in Free Trade Agreements
• Concerns around the security and privacy of data
• The environmental impact of digital trade
• Relevant legal frameworks},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
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Oral testimony on the UK House of Commons International Trade Committee. The Committee has launched an inquiry into digital trade and data. Digital trade refers to digitally enabled, or digitally delivered, trade in goods and services. Such trade involves the movement of data.
The Committee’s inquiry will explore a range of issues, including:
• Digital trade and data provisions in Free Trade Agreements
• Concerns around the security and privacy of data
• The environmental impact of digital trade
• Relevant legal frameworks
The Committee’s inquiry will explore a range of issues, including:
• Digital trade and data provisions in Free Trade Agreements
• Concerns around the security and privacy of data
• The environmental impact of digital trade
• Relevant legal frameworks